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So spake the Fiend, and with necessitie, 
The Tyrants plea, excus’d his devilish deeds. 
-John Milton, Paradise Lost 
 
On February 15, 2019, President Donald Trump proclaimed a national emergency 
because “[t]he current situation at the southern border presents a border security and 
humanitarian crisis that threatens core national security interests and constitutes a national 
emergency.” Intending to circumvent negotiations with Congress over funding his border wall, 
Trump used the National Emergencies Act to activate sections 2808 and 12302 of title 10, United 
States Code to fund the border wall through unspent Department of Defense funds.1 Trump’s 
policies on immigration across the U.S.-Mexico border play into a long history of anti-immigrant 
politics in the United States and racially-driven politics within the conservative movement. 
However, unexplored by contemporary historians, the mechanism Trump is using to address the 
“crisis” at the southern border deserves more attention.  
In the shadow of Watergate and the Vietnam War, Congress passed the National 
Emergencies Act in 1976 to terminate national emergencies, restrict the president’s powers 
during those emergencies, and create a procedure to give Congress more authority and 
information in future exercises of emergency power. The act was one of many pieces of 
legislation in the 1970s aiming to promote government transparency, limit presidential power, 
and protect individual rights. The 1973 War Powers Resolution, the 1978 Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, the 1978 Independent Counsel Act, the 1976 Government in the Sunshine Act, 
the 1974 Privacy Act, the 1974 Impoundment Control Act, 1978 the Presidential Records Act, 
and 1978 Ethics in Government Act all curtailed executive authority to the benefit of Congress’s, 
                                                          
1 Donald J. Trump, Proclamation, “Presidential Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the 
Southern Border of the United States, Proclamation 9844 of February 15, 2019,” Federal Register 84 (February 20, 
2019): 4949, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/20/2019-03011/declaring-a-national-
emergency-concerning-the-southern-border-of-the-united-states 
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while establishing or reforming procedures for exercising executive power. At the same time, 
Congress delegated less power to administrative agencies in the 1970s and early 1980s, asserting 
greater legislative control over agency decision-making.2 The National Emergencies Act fits into 
a broader political trend, but unlike these other laws, it reflects on a much longer history of 
national emergencies in American politics. 
By declaring a national emergency to build his signature border wall, Trump is adding to 
a century-long history of presidents declaring national emergencies to activate dormant statutory 
powers. The basic legal mechanics for exercising emergency powers have existed since World 
War I. Congress will pass laws called “delegatory statutes” giving the president the power to take 
a certain action “in a national emergency” or “under a threat of war.” The president then declares 
a national emergency, giving them the authority to summon the necessary delegatory statutes. 
What constitutes a national emergency is almost entirely up to the president’s discretion. As 
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist no. 23 about powers of national defense, “These powers 
ought to exist, without limitation; because it, is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and 
variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may 
be necessary to satisfy them.” As a result, he argued, “The circumstances that endanger the 
safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason, no constitutional shackles can wisely be 
imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.”3 The Supreme Court acceded this 
view in the 1812 case Martin v. Mott, which held that the president has the exclusive power to 
determine when the nation faces an existential exigency.4 
                                                          
2 Shapiro, Sidney A., and Robert L. Glicksman. “Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in 
Administrative Law.” Duke Law Journal 1988, no. 5 (November 1988): 819. https://doi.org/10.2307/1372642. j 
3 Alexander Hamilton, “No. 23: The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to 
the Preservation of the Union,” in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor, 
1999), 148–53. 
4 Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19 (1827). 
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Why do emergencies matter? As Obama Chief of Staff and later-Chicago Mayor Rahm 
Emanuel told the Wall Street Journal during the 2008 campaign, “You never want to a serious 
crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that, is that it’s an opportunity to do things you think 
you could not do before.”5 While it drew the ire of conservative commentators, Emanuel’s 
aphorism reflects a broader truth in American history. Stephen Skowronek writes, “Crisis 
situations tend to become the watersheds in a state's institutional development.”6 Because they 
very quickly present an urgent problem, which pushes politicians towards a single solution, 
emergencies and ensuing emergency powers are powerful forces for shaping American politics. 
Thus, Congress’s attempt to restrict the president’s emergency powers through the National 
Emergencies Act has a broader significance beyond interbranch conflict; instead, it is a rebuke of 
an emboldened executive, the political vehicle that helped create an activist federal government 
in the 20th century. 
The National Emergencies Act also signifies a political shift, as modern American 
liberalism, which had championed an emboldened executive since the Progressive Era and later 
New Deal, shifted to reject an imperial presidency, fearing the deleterious effects of unchecked 
power. Where once liberals saw emergency powers as an effective means of expanding the 
federal government, those liberals who drafted the National Emergencies Act saw emergency 
powers as a highway to autocracy, particularly because the end of the Vietnam War, Watergate, 
and détente showed the perils of presidential power, as well as the diminished need. With the end 
of the New Deal order came the end of the New Deal emphasis on the presidency. As liberals in 
the 1970s moved away from president-centric governance, the burgeoning conservative 
                                                          
5 Jack Rosenthal, “A Terrible Thing to Waste,” The New York Times, July 31, 2009, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/magazine/02FOB-onlanguage-t.html. 
6 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–
1920, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pg. 10. 
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movement slowly came to embrace presidential power as both a tool for curtailing the federal 
government domestically and commanding a unified anti-communist policy abroad. The 
Republican Party’s rejection of détente, exemplified by Ronald Reagan’s 1976 primary bid, 
conservative criticism of the Panama Canal Treaties, and the Team B report on the CIA’s 
assessment of Soviet military capabilities was part of resurgent anti-communist politics in the 
late 1970s. This anti-communism pushed Republicans to embrace a strong unitary executive, 
who would wield powers to decisively defend America’s national interests. 
This thesis interacts with the growing historical literature on 20th-century American 
politics and makes important contributions by examining the politics of presidential power, a 
significant lacuna in the current historiography. Current historical scholarship has also adapted to 
criticism of Consensus History by emphasizing social, political, and economic conflict to 
deconstruct pre-existing myths. Recent scholarship has emphasized politics outdoors, that is 
political organizations and institutions beyond public officeholders, who featured prominently in 
Consensus and New Left historiography. Even within established political institutions, historians 
have emphasized procedures and process, like Julian Zelizer’s On Capitol Hill, which like this 
thesis, explores how procedures impact the political landscape. American Political Development, 
a branch of political science, has also contributed significantly to the ongoing revival of 
American political history and is highly relevant for this thesis’s understanding of the growth of 
the American state. However, the most comprehensive history of national emergencies still 
remains research published by the National Emergencies Act’s drafters; not only have historians 
not examined the National Emergencies Act, but presidential history has fallen out of style, as 
social, cultural, and environmental histories have become en vogue. Studies of the presidency 
and of presidents have become an endangered species within academia, relegated to the protected 
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area of the Barnes & Noble history section. While histories of the presidencies are lacking, 
historical scholarship on politics during and since the 1970s is abundant, with works by Bruce 
Schulman, Beth Bailey, and David Farber chronicling the decade’s complex nexus of culture, 
identity, and politics.7 This thesis readdresses the lack of historical scholarship on the presidency 
by examining presidential power within the broader social and cultural context of the 70s and by 
highlighting the importance of procedure in deciding the limits of presidential powers. This 
thesis also addresses the traditional left-right debate over presidential power, but at the same time 
examines inter-branch conflict as an additional and useful analytical framework for 
understanding debates over presidential power in the 1970s.  
Some recent scholarship has shed light on emergencies and war in American history. 
Mary Dudziak’s War Time meditates on how the semi-permanent state of war attributed to the 
War on Terror has a much deeper history than many expect and how even conventional wars 
often lack clean beginnings and ends.8 Jefferson Cowie’s The Great Exception studies period 
between 1933 and the 1970s as an exception in American history, marked by high union 
participation, low immigration, low income inequality, a decline in religious observance, race 
and culture’s role in politics, and the birth of the American welfare state.9 Interestingly, the 
United States was in a continuous national emergency from 1933 to 1976, when the National 
Emergencies Act terminated it, making the period a legal exception as well. Legal scholars have 
also focused on emergency powers as a factor eroding legal liberalism and the rule of law. This 
scholarship, particularly prominent after 9/11, drew on political theory to analyze national 
                                                          
7 Bruce Schulman, The Seventies : The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: Free Press, 
2001).; Beth Bailey and David R. Farber, America in the Seventies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004). 
8 Mary Dudziak, War  Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
9 Jefferson Cowie, The Great Exception: The New Deal & the Limits of American Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2016). 
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emergency legal regimes, their history, and their effect on legal systems. Kim Scheppele, 
Sanford Levinson, Jules Lobel, Oren Gross, Adrian Vermeuele, and Eric Posner have all written 
on emergencies and American constitutionalism with varying degrees of consensus.10 The legal 
scholarship on emergencies, while rich, often aims for a prescription for the present rather than a 
description of the past, but still provides a more thorough historical analysis of emergencies than 
most historical scholarship. By combining legal and historical literature with a study of archival 
documents, this thesis hopes to analyze the politics of power surrounding debates over 
emergency powers in the 1970s. This thesis should not pique the interest of only historians, legal 
scholars, or political scientists; because of President Trump’s  
This thesis will first explore how the senators who worked to pass the National 
Emergencies Act and similar laws saw the rise of presidential power in the 20th century, 
constructing a historical critique of the presidency, which New Deal liberals came to champion 
as a means of growing and managing the federal government during the Great Depression, 
World War II, and Cold War. The second chapter will tell the narrative history of how liberal 
senators opposed to the Vietnam War came to address what they perceived as dangerously 
unchecked emergency powers. Frank Church and Charles Mathias’s attempt to address 
emergency powers fits neatly into the distrust of public institutions pervasive in the 1970s and 
liberals’ rising opposition to a strong presidency after Watergate and Vietnam. The third chapter 
examines the political and legislative history of the National Emergencies Act after Richard 
                                                          
10 Kim Lane Scheppele, “North American Emergencies: The Use of Emergency Powers in Canada and the United 
States,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 4, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 213–43, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mol003.; Sanford Levinson, “CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS IN A STATE OF PERMANENT 
EMERGENCY," Georgia Law Review 40, no 3 (Spring, 2006): 699-751.;Jules Lobel, “Emergency Power and the 
Decline of Liberalism,” The Yale Law Journal 98, no. 7 (May 1989): 1385, https://doi.org/10.2307/796748.; Oren 
Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?,” The Yale Law Journal 112 
(2003): 124.; Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound : After the Madisonian Republic (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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Nixon’s resignation in August 1974. Negotiations between senators and the Ford administration 
led the bill’s drafters to amend the legislation, introducing minor procedural changes which 
would have profound ramifications post-passage. Here, this thesis also explores how 
conservatives came to celebrate a strong presidency after decades of anti-executive skepticism. 
The thesis concludes with an assessment of the National Emergencies Act from 1976 to the 
present day, analyzing how a bill intended to prevent the abuse of emergency powers, came to 
commit the very sin it was intended to prevent. 
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CHAPTER 1: A New Emergency 
Introduction 
On the warm morning of July 19, 1968, Senator William J. Fulbright (D-AR) sent his 
testimony to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers. In front of 
Chairman Sam Ervin (D-NC), Dr. Seth Tillman, a close aide to Fulbright, read the senator’s 
statement on what he saw as the rotting of American governance. “The authority of Congress in 
foreign policy has been eroding steadily since 1940, the year of America's emergence as a major 
and permanent participant in world affairs, and the erosion has created a significant 
constitutional imbalance. Many, if not most of the major decisions of American foreign policy in 
this era have been executive decisions.”11 While Fulbright lamented Congress’s dwindling role 
in foreign affairs, he said, “there are signs in the Congress, particularly in the Senate, of a 
growing awareness of the loss of congressional power, of growing uneasiness over the extent of 
Executive power, and of a growing willingness to raise questions that a year or so ago might 
have gone unasked, to challenge decisions that would have gone unchallenged, and to try to 
distinguish between real emergencies and situations which, for reasons of Executive 
convenience, are only said to be emergencies.”12  
But how and why did this imbalance of powers come to be? “The cause of the 
constitutional imbalance is crisis,” wrote Senator Fulbright. “In the main,” Fulbright continued, 
“it has been circumstance rather than design which has given the Executive its great 
predominance in foreign policy. The circumstance has been crisis, an entire era of crisis in which 
urgent decisions have been required again and again, decisions of a kind that the Congress is ill-
                                                          
11 A Study of the Separation of Powers between the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative Branches of Government 
provided by the Constitution, before Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers, 90th Cong. 41 (July 19, 1968) 
(Statement of William J. Fulbright, United States Senator) (hereafter cited as Fulbright Testimony). 
12 Fulbright Testimony, Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, pg. 43. 
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equipped to make with what has been thought to be the requisite speed.”13 Fulbright, expressing 
an opinion shared by several colleagues, saw the mid-20th century as an era of crises which 
threatened the constitutional order and which Congress needed to address. Far beyond the power 
over foreign affairs, senators worried how the fundamental liberties of American citizens could 
survive abuses by an executive wielding undemocratic emergency power. A Senate committee 
reported at this time that, “Most of the statutes pertaining to emergency powers were passed in 
times of extreme crisis,” and that these laws were of such significance to civil liberties, to the 
operation of domestic and foreign commerce, and the general functioning of the U.S. 
Government, that, in microcosm, “they reflect dominant trends in the political, economic, and 
judicial life in the United States.”14  
In order to address how Congress restricted unbridled presidential emergency power 
during the 1970s, it helps to understand their perspective on how and why these emergency 
powers accumulated, and how the National Emergencies Act fit into long-running criticism of 
emergency powers. In the views of these senators and some historians, crisis drove the growth of 
the presidency in the 20th century, demanding expedited responses outside of cumbersome 
constitutional procedures.15 Resolving national crises demanded increased presidential authority 
and an emboldened federal government, causing presidential emergency powers to accumulate 
over decades. Despite persistent criticism from the Old Right, liberals largely embraced an 
emboldened presidency during the Great Depression and Cold War, until the Vietnam War. 
                                                          
13 Fulbright Testimony, Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, pg. 42 
14 Frank Church, and Charles Mathias, Emergency Power Statutes: Provisions of Federal Law now in Effect 
Delegating to the Executive Extraordinary Authority in Time of National Emergency, report prepared for the Special 
Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, 93rd Cong. 1st sess., 1973, Committee Print 93-000, pg. 
7. 
15 Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
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However, by the late-1960s, Congress began to assert itself into the prerogatives of an executive 
branch it increasingly distrusted. 
 
New Deal and World War II 
The Great Depression thrust the United States into the deepest economic crisis in its 
history and the resulting New Deal fundamentally changed the relationship between the 
American citizen and the state. When Franklin Roosevelt took office in March 1933, the nation 
was in crisis. Gross National Product had fallen by half, 5,000 banks had failed,16 millions were 
unemployed, and slums sprouted in the shadow of America’s decrepit cities. When World War I 
veterans began squatting in government buildings along Pennsylvania Avenue, President Hoover 
had Gen. Douglas MacArthur drive them out with bayonets and tear gas.17 
When a landslide victory swept Roosevelt into office in 1932, he promised to tackle the 
economic crisis in war-like terms. In his first inaugural address, he said: “I shall ask the Congress 
for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad Executive power to wage a war 
against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact 
invaded by a foreign foe.”18 That line earned the loudest applause of the speech, revealing wide 
public support for strengthening executive authority.19 The speech and what it portended was a 
pivotal moment in the history of modern liberalism. Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition, a shaky 
kaleidoscope of factions and interests born from his first two terms in office, would dominate 
American politics for decades, transform the American state, and remain monumental even 
                                                          
16 Jefferson Cowie, The Great Exception: The New Deal & the Limits of American Politics, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2016), pg. 98. 
17 William E. Leuchtenburg, The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton, (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), pg. 139. 
18 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/208712. 
19 Cowie, The Great Exception, pg. 96. 
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today. The departure from normalcy would be permanent. As Roosevelt, himself said, “We could 
never go back to the old order.”20 
 The root of this sea change, the New Deal, particularly the First New Deal, was an 
emergency measure that invested unprecedented power in the president. Based on the World War 
I template, Franklin Roosevelt declared a national emergency on March 6, 1933, two days after 
assuming office. He did this to declare a bank holiday under section 5(b) of the Trading with the 
Enemy Act until March 9, when he called a special session of Congress to resolve the banking 
crisis.21 Because the law had technically lapsed, this statutory authority was questionable at best, 
and although it was retroactively blessed by Congress, it led former President Hoover to compare 
it to Hitler’s burning of the Reichstag, producing a false emergency.22 On March 9, the House 
passed the Emergency Banking Act after 38 minutes of debate. The Senate passed it that evening 
and eight hours after its introduction, Roosevelt signed the bill into law.23 The law revived the 
Trading with the Enemy Act and amended it to operate in national emergencies, kicking off 
Roosevelt’s Hundred Days.24 
 The rhetoric of an impending national emergency festooned New Deal politics. 
Campaigning in 1936, Roosevelt said, “Three and a half years ago we declared war on 
depression. You and I know today that that war is being won.” When accepting the Democratic 
re-nomination, he said, “I accept the commission you have tendered me. I join with you. I am 
enlisted for the duration of the war.”25 Aside from Roosevelt himself, Robert Wagner argued that 
                                                          
20 Franklin Roosevelt, On Our Way, (New York: The John Day company, 1934), pg. 36. 
21 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14661, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14485. 
22 Leuchtenberg, The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton, pg. 146. 
23 Leuchtenberg, The American President: From Teddy Roosevelt to Bill Clinton, pg. 148. 
24 Michael R. Belknap, "New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine." Tex. L. Rev. 62 (1983): pg. 73. 
25 William E Leuchtenberg, “The New Deal and the Analogue of War,” in Change and Continuity in Twentieth 
Century America, ed. John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and Everett Walters, (Columbia, OH: Ohio State University 
Press, 1964), pg. 136-137. 
Ong, 15 
 
because of the economic emergency, Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause increased. 
The Supreme Court would later dismiss the emergency power doctrine, which holds that the 
government’s power increases during a national emergency under a “flexible constitution.”26 
Despite this, the emergency dominated the political sphere and demanded a unified national 
effort, akin to war. Brain Trust economist Rexford Tugwell wrote in his 1935 book The Battle 
for Democracy, that wartime democracies “achieve unity to an extent which seems extraordinary 
to one viewing the wartime economy from the tangled confusion of peacetime values.”27 Speaker 
Rainy, passing the Emergency Banking Act, compared it to World War I: “Today we are 
engaged in another war, more serious even in its character and presenting greater dangers to the 
Republic.”28 There were also legal ramifications for this emergency rhetoric; according to 
attorney Roger Roots, Roosevelt’s Banking Holiday arguably violated the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments, the Contracts Clause, and the Non-Delegation Doctrine, but faced no 
challenge in the Supreme Court.29 
 The thesis of crisis-based state building, centered around executive power, is found in 
both political science and history and explains why emergency powers grew nearly unchecked 
for decades after the New Deal.30 A thorough analysis of the New Deal is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but the role of crisis in it is key to understanding Congress’s later reading of history 
and historians’ explanations for the growth of executive power. Much of the New Deal, 
especially the First New Deal, centered around the economic emergency facing the country and 
                                                          
26 Belknap, New Deal and the Emergency Powers, 86-87. 
27 Rexford, The Battle for Democracy (New York, 1935), pg. 296, cited in Leuchtenberg, “The New Deal and the 
Analogue of War,” pg. 106. 
28 Leuchtenberg, “The New Deal and the Analogue of War,” pg. 107. 
29 Roger I. Roots, "Government by Permanent Emergency: The Forgotten History of the New Deal Constitution." 
Suffolk UL Rev. 33 (1999): 262. 
30 Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
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the political rhetoric reflected that. The reason for this was the urgent need to build support for a 
stronger American state. As historian William Leuchtenberg has argued, “the New Dealers 
resorted to the analogue of war, because in America the sense of community is weak, the distrust 
of the state is strong.”31 Julian Zelizer, analyzing resistance to high taxes since the New Deal, 
notes one consistent and critical strategy politicians have used to convince and anti-tax electorate 
of the need for more state revenue is a national crisis; During World War II for instance, “when 
policy makers sold the mass income tax through a national public relations campaign that 
promoted taxpaying as the patriotic duty of citizens who were not fighting abroad.” As Zelizer 
notes, broad-based anti-statism has continually shaped American political culture, making 
national crises critical inflection points for the growth of state power, and by extension, 
executive power.32 
The broad executive power that the Roosevelt, and later Truman, espoused had its origins 
decades earlier in the Progressive Era. Woodrow Wilson, in his work Congressional 
Government, argued that the separation of powers was antiquated and threatened America’s 
national development as it entered a new, modern age. He wrote,  
“The evident explanation of this change of attitude towards the Constitution is that we have been 
made conscious by the rude shock of the war and by subsequent developments of policy, that 
there has been a vast alteration in the conditions of government; that the checks and balances 
which once obtained are no longer effective; and that we are really living under a constitution 
essentially different from that which we have been so long worshiping as our own peculiar and 
incomparable possession. In short, this model government is no longer conformable with its own 
original pattern.”33 
                                                          
31 Leuchtenberg, “The New Deal and the Analogue of War,” in Braeman, Brenner and Walters eds. Change and 
Continuity in Twentieth Century America, pg. 142. 
32 Julian E. Zelizer, Governing America: The Revival of Political History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2012), pg. 99. 
33 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1885), 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/35861/35861-h/35861-h.htm. 
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 Stephen Skowronek finds in this “Progressive Paradigm” two premises: “that the 
Constitution thwarted necessary action” and “that the Constitution did not stand in the way of its 
own reconstruction.”34 As a result, progressives, seeking a more flexible and assertive federal 
government, pushed for a more powerful presidency grounded in popular sovereignty. The 
presidency was a means for the people to manifest their will, or as Wilson wrote, “The nation as 
a whole has chosen him and is conscious that it has no other political spokesman. His is the only 
national voice in affairs. Let him once win the admiration and confidence of the country, and no 
other single force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily overpower him.”35 
Theodore Roosevelt took this idea further, arguing in the 1912 election for recall elections of 
presidents who had lost popular support.36 At the same time, the federal government would 
become more institutionalized and laden with experts, which would surround and guide the 
presidency, sharing power within the executive branch.37 
 Scholars played a critical role in the growth of the presidency in the 20th century. From 
FDR to Johnson, the presidential synthesis dominated American history. Scholars like Arthur 
Schlesinger, Richard Hofstadter, William Leuchtenberg, helped place the presidency at the 
center of American history and political time. At the same time, political scientists like Clinton 
Rossiter, Edward Corwin, and Richard Neustadt, whose 1960 work Presidential Power became a 
leading handbook on the presidency, focused on presidential preeminence in American politics.38 
Often times these scholars would work within liberal presidential administrations or the liberal 
                                                          
34 Stephen Skowronek, “The Unsettled State of Presidential History,” in Recapturing the Oval Office 
New Historical Approaches to the American Presidency, eds. Bruce Schulman and Brian Balogh, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2015), pg. 18. 
35 Woodrow Wilson, “The President of the United States,” in Constitutional Government of the United 
States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908) https://online.hillsdale.edu/file/presidency/lecture-4/The-
President-Of-the-United-States-Woodrow-Wilson-Pgs.-649-660.pdf. 
36 Skowronek, “The Unsettled State of Presidential History,” pg. 19. 
37 Skowronek, “The Unsettled State of Presidential History,” pg. 20. 
38 Zelizer, Governing America, pg. 18-20. 
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advocacy group Americans for Democratic Action; the same scholars behind the liberal 
consensus to the political predominance of the presidency. The growth of presidential power was 
integral to American liberalism in the mid-20th century; Julian Zelizer writes, “The synthesis 
presented three views about the presidency: the president was an engine of liberal policy; the 
presidency had grown in power over the course of the twentieth century, and the president was 
the prime mover in national politics since the New Deal…. The growth of presidential power and 
the triumph of liberalism went hand in hand.”39 
While Roosevelt did not assert unilateral presidential power to pursue the New Deal, he 
did rely heavily on congressional statutes delegating powers to him which a national emergency 
activated, relying largely on the model Wilson used during World War I.40 William 
Leuchtenberg writes, “There was scarcely a New Deal act or agency that did not owe something 
to the experience of World War I.”41 Leuchtenberg argues that because “[World War I] wartime 
control of industry went much further efforts in recognizing the place of the twentieth-century 
state,” the war analogue was an effective rallying cry for the New Deal.42  
Just as effective as the war analogue was an actual war. Legal historian Michael Belknap 
points out that the same Supreme Court, which widely rejected the emergency powers doctrine 
proposed to justify the New Deal’s radical expansion of government power, accepted the same 
justification for sweeping federal authority during World War II. Cases like Schechter Poultry, 
US v. Butler, and Carter v. Carter Coal Co. handed the Roosevelt administration resounding 
defeats, while in wartime cases like Korematsu v. US, Yakus v. US, and Hirabayashi v. US, the 
Court accepted that military exigencies could justify circumventing the Fourteenth and Fourth 
                                                          
39 Zelizer, Governing America, pg. 20. 
40 Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pg. 115. 
41 Leuchtenberg, The New Deal and the Analogue of War, pg. 109. 
42 Leuchtenberg, The New Deal and the Analogue of War, pg. 143. 
Ong, 19 
 
Amendment.43 The Supreme Court was far more deferential to emergency powers in wartime 
than during economic crises, enshrining an emergency powers doctrine which has endured intact 
to the present day.  
In addition to favorable Supreme Court precedent, World War II expanded emergency 
powers by practice, the significance of which scholars and senators later fumed over. By 1940, 
the threat of war from Europe and the Pacific loomed, leading Roosevelt to take preemptive steps 
to involve the United States in the conflict. This sometimes put him at odds with constitutional 
norms; for instance, Roosevelt ignited a political and legal firestorm when he signed a 
Destroyers-for-Bases deal with the U.K. without congressional consent.44 Roosevelt backed up 
his decision with an opinion by Attorney General Robert Jackson, a pragmatic supporter of 
executive prerogative. Wendell Wilkie called it “the most dictatorial and arbitrary act of any 
president in the history of the United States.”45 This deal set a significant precedent; in 1953, 
Harold Stein wrote, “The acquisition of a dozen bases and gifts of fifty destroyers that President 
Roosevelt moved on so cautiously less than fifteen years ago would be a routine, indeed a minor 
transaction today.”46  
 The onset of World War II brought another national emergency, which in the eyes of 
Fulbright and his colleagues, marked the further development of presidential power and 
congressional indolence. On Sept. 8, 1939, as German troops swept through Poland, Roosevelt 
issued a “limited” national emergency in case American interests were threatened. Dubbing it 
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“limited” did not actually change the emergency powers Roosevelt could assume, but it helped 
assuage political attacks against Roosevelt for intervening in European affairs.47 In May 1941 
Roosevelt declared an unlimited national emergency; together, these two declarations served as 
the basis for the enormous delegation of wartime power to come. The 1941 Lend-Lease Act, the 
Emergency Price Control Act, and the First and Second War Powers Acts gave the president 
immense power to regulate the American economy. Each of these laws contained clauses 
allowing Congress to repeal a president’s executive orders empowered by these laws, but 
Roosevelt, despite finding these provisions unconstitutional, signed them regardless.48 Using 
emergency powers, Roosevelt seized plants which failed to produce military equipment, set 
prices and wages, negotiated international agreements to station U.S. troops abroad without 
Congressional consent, froze foreign assets, and detained 110,000 Japanese-Americans.49 
Japanese internment was the most egregious exercise of war powers. In his dissent, which 
foreshadowed the language of the National Emergencies Act’s backers, then-Associate Justice 
Robert Jackson wrote the decision was a “loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any new 
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of urgent need.”50 
 Despite largely working hand-in-hand with Congress, Roosevelt also made provocative 
assertions of inherent presidential authority, foreshadowing later acts by Truman and Nixon. In 
cajoling Congress to repeal part of the Price Control Act, Roosevelt stated, “In the event that 
Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will act…. 
The President has the power, under the Constitution and under Congressional acts, to take 
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measures necessary to avert a disaster which would interfere with winning the war.” At the end 
of the emergency, Roosevelt would lay down these authorities and restore the presidency to 
normality.51 This, Roosevelt’s most stark assertion of presidential authority shows just how much 
power Roosevelt had infused into the presidency. 
 
Cold War 
According to Roosevelt, victory in World War II should have brought a swift termination 
to presidential power. However, through a patchwork of declarations and extensions, wartime 
powers from World War II extended well into the 1950s, furthering the constitutional imbalance 
which liberal anti-war senators later described.52 President Truman officially declared an end to 
hostilities on Dec. 31, 1946, but noted a state of war still existed.53 Congress did not officially 
end the war with Germany until 1951 and Japan until 1952; in mid-1947, at Truman’s request, 
Congress repealed most, but not all, wartime delegatory statutes.54 The Supreme Court even 
weighed in; in a case surrounding rent controls operating after the war, Justice Douglas wrote, 
“the war power does not necessarily end with the cessation of hostilities.”55 Frayed at its 
boundaries, World War II’s unsure end fed directly into the Cold War, and its first major conflict 
in Korea. On June 25, 1950, Soviet-backed North Korea invaded the American-backed South; 
within five days, President Truman dispatched American ground forces into the conflict. 
However, by October, China entered the war and by December, the war became a protracted and 
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bloody stalemate along the 38th parallel.56 By the 1953 armistice, two million Americans had 
served, 36,574 had died, and the American government had been transformed.57 
After conferring with Congressional leaders, on December 16, 1950, President Truman 
declared a national emergency, because “world conquest by communist imperialism is the goal 
of the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world.”58 The proclamation justified 
itself by citing then Korean conflict, but also cited the threat posed by communist world conquest 
to American liberties as the reason for the national emergency.59 This national emergency served 
much the same purpose as Roosevelt’s 1939 national emergency: to activate statutory emergency 
powers allowing the president to fix prices, implement wage controls and expedite wartime 
production.60 However, it was open-ended, intended to last until communism no longer 
threatened the United States, perpetuating a state of permanent emergencies which later troubled 
Congress. 
Drafting the proclamation fell to Adrian Fisher, a middle-aged State Department lawyer 
and Harvard Law graduate who had advised the government’s case in Korematsu, the case which 
upheld Japanese internment.61 Because war with Germany and Japan technically had not ended 
and the Truman administration could thus draw on those war powers, Fisher did not intend the 
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1950 national emergency to have any legal effect. Instead, it was, “an expression of the national 
will of the United States.”62 Nevertheless, this emergency was an integral part of the national 
security apparatus, as it was the basis for domestic and international economic controls. 
The growth of the national security apparatus as a result of the Korean war was 
immediate and obvious. In 1949, Truman proposed a ceiling on defense spending of $14.5 
billion that would last for the foreseeable future.63 In September 1950, after intervening in Korea, 
Truman publicly demanded doubling the defense budget from $15 billion to $30 billion.64 Later 
that month, Truman approved NSC-68, a policy paper envisioning a permanent struggle with 
communism and requiring a vast global American military commitment. As Stephen Griffin 
argues, this strategy, the result of internal executive branch deliberations, had significant 
constitutional implications, since it required the president to wield both the material and legal 
means to defeat communism. Thus, it assumed the unilateral power of the president over ad 
bellum war powers. Griffin writes, “If that strategy [containment] involved the capacity to 
respond quickly to multiple foreign threats with overwhelming force, that meant the president 
had to possess the power to initiate military action, even war, as he saw fit.”65  
Crises and the administrative demands which followed also grew the presidency in 
physical terms. During World War II, President Roosevelt had no more than 11 White House 
staff assistants, which expanded to 13 with Truman, 37 with Eisenhower, and up to 48 under 
Nixon, greatly increasing the administrative capacity of the Executive Office of the President. 
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The total Executive Office staff under Nixon amounted to 5395 people in 1971, nearly five times 
the number under Eisenhower in 1954. The creation of a centralized staff around the president 
was a product of the Great Depression when the 1939 Government Reorganization Act created 
the Executive Office of the President to help Roosevelt manage the myriad of economic and 
social programs under his purview. The office grew further during the Cold War until the 
presidency bore little resemblance to its pre-New Deal predecessors.66 
Yet the powers of the president, even during the Cold War, were not limitless. In the 
spring of 1952, the United Steel Workers struck, threatening the U.S.’s wartime steel production, 
which was vital for everything from bullets to jeep bumpers to plane engines. Truman, believing 
any lapse of steel production would threaten the war effort, ordered the nationalization of the 
steel mills on the basis of his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief. The factory owners 
sued to retake their factories and the case shortly reached the Supreme Court. In Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, a case which scholars have compared to Marbury v. Madison and 
Brown v. Board of Education, the court ruled 6-3 against President Truman, finding his radical 
interpretation of the commander-in-chief clause erroneous.67 
In an opinion that State Department legal adviser under President Obama Harold Koh 
later called a foundation of the “national security constitution,” Justice Robert Jackson developed 
a highly influential tripartite framework that would come to define the relationship between 
Congress, the presidency, and the Constitution, which said outside of the Constitution, Congress 
is the key determiner of presidential power and can either check or embolden the presidency.68 In 
ruling against Truman, Jackson had become far more suspicious of executive power, which he 
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had once championed as Roosevelt’s Attorney General who wrote the legal justification for the 
Destroyers-for-Bases deal. This concurrence is especially important, as the Special Committee 
on the Termination of the National Emergency later adopted Justice Jackson’s concurrence as its 
framework for writing the 1976 National Emergencies Act.69  
 Identifying three types of presidential action, Jackson wrote, 
“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, 
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that 
Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it 
may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty… 
“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. 
“When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”70 
However, despite Jackson’s ruling in the Steel Seizure Case, Truman’s 1950 national 
emergency, relying on the permanent threat of communism, would further perpetuate 
presidential emergency powers, much to Congress’s later chagrin. As NSC-68 stated, the nature 
of nuclear weapons, the unacceptable consequences of Soviet hegemony over Eurasia and the 
aggressive nature of international communism meant the United States had to contend endlessly 
with communism through all measures short of war.71 Thus, the permanent communist menace 
would engender a permanent state of emergency, enlarging the presidency and collapsing the 
distinction between war and peace. This was a view shared by contemporaries. “In the mind of 
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the Truman administration,” Michael Hogan writes, “the distinction between war and peace had 
dissolved in a view of the Cold War as a permanent state of national emergency.”72 
Just as the persistent crisis posed by international communism justified the expansion of 
presidential power, it also justified one of the largest expansions of the federal government in the 
20th century. Andrew Grossman, reflecting on American Political Development’s research on the 
early Cold War, remarks, “Law-making in an atmosphere of emergency planning (1947–1953) 
institutionalized the centralization of power in the executive branch of government…”73 
Although he emphasizes continuity with older American anti-statist traditions, Michael Hogan 
concedes, “there is no doubt that new responsibilities and perceived threats led to an 
unprecedented peacetime allocation of resources to the military arm of the state, and to the 
creation of powerful government agencies that had not existed before. Both developments 
amounted to major departures from American tradition, both added enormously to the size and 
power of the state, and both took the state in new directions.”74 As Eisenhower said in his 
farewell address, the conflict with communism “commands our whole attention, absorbs our very 
beings. We face a hostile ideology- global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, 
and insidious in method.” As a result, he argued, “we can no longer risk emergency 
improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments 
industry of vast proportions.”75 Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall argue, “Just as the New 
Deal created an array of institutions and interests that say their prosperity and even their 
                                                          
72 Hogan, A Cross of Iron, pg. 319 
73 Andrew D. Grossman, "The early Cold War and American political development: Reflections on recent research," 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 15, no. 3 (2002): 471-483. 
74 Hogan, A Cross of Iron, pg. 464 
75 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People,” (speech, Washington 
D.C., January 17, 1961), Eisenhower Presidential Library, 
https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches/farewell_address.pdf 
Ong, 27 
 
existence tied to the ever-greater expansion of the American state, the Cold War did the same 
thing after 1950 in the area of foreign policy, though on a greater scale.”76  
As the Cold War dragged on, national emergencies began to pile up. By the early 1970s, 
Roosevelt’s 1933 national emergency and Truman’s 1950 national emergency were still in 
effect. President Eisenhower in 1960 and 1961 and President Kennedy in 1962 both extended a 
1933 executive order, made under the 1933 national emergency, banning the holding or export of 
gold.77 In 1968, President Johnson used section 5b of the Trading with the Enemy Act to regulate 
the United States’ balance of payments without reference to Congress.78 This was a particularly 
egregious move which would appear frequently in later congressional hearings. Johnson, without 
consulting Congress, drew up and promulgated an entire regulatory program for U.S. companies 
engaging in foreign direct investment, supported by an entire bureaucratic apparatus. Emergency 
powers became part of routine economic management; between 1945 and 1952, the U.S. 
government seized and operated 35 private businesses, relying on the War Labor Disputes Act 
and, after it expired, the 1916 Transportation Act.79 
This raised the specter of an undemocratic slide. Robert S. Rankin and Winfried 
Dallmyr’s 1962 Freedom and Emergency Powers in the Cold War analyzed three contemporary 
exercises of emergency powers: labor disputes, non-military defense, and racial equality. 
Domestic efforts to maintain a stable economy, protect America’s image on the world stage, and 
ensure adequate civil defense all required the expansion of government power and in these cases, 
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emergency powers. They wrote, “In a constitutional system dedicated to the preservation of 
individual liberties, expanding emergency functions of the government raise problems of grave 
importance and magnitude. The basic and inescapable question is, How can a democracy face the 
challenge of the cold war and still remain a democracy?” The use of federal marshals to promote 
civil rights, industrial seizures and a growing federal civil defense apparatus all shifted the 
balance toward the presidency and toward states of emergency.80  
These national emergencies had criminal consequences for certain Americans, 
particularly those who violated emergency presidential decrees. In the 1957 case Bauer v. United 
States, the Ninth Circuit also upheld Bauer’s conviction under Roosevelt’s 1933 emergency. 81In 
1965, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals again upheld the conviction of two individuals for 
hoarding gold in violation of Roosevelt’s executive order.82 That same year, in Sardino v. 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Second Circuit upheld the appellant’s conviction for 
violating the U.S. embargo of Cuba, which rested on the validity of the Trading with the Enemy 
Act and Truman’s 1950 emergency declaration. Judge Friendly wrote, “While the court will not 
review a determination so peculiarly within the province of the chief executive, there can hardly 
be doubt as to the existence of an emergency today when thousands of United States troops are 
in action and many more are in readiness around the globe.”83 
The Politics of Presidential Powers in the New Deal Era 
 At the same time that liberals developed an appetite for executive power, conservatives, 
playing into a long anti-statist tradition in American politics, expressed their opposition to 
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centralized state authority from the Roosevelt to the Johnson administration. The Old Right, 
epitomized by ‘Mr. Republican’ Sen. Robert Taft, starkly opposed to the New Deal and the 
changes it had wrought but equally detested how Roosevelt had transformed the executive 
branch. “By 1945 Franklin Roosevelt represented the Right's major institutional enemy-the 
strong chief executive. The presidency and the entire executive branch had mushroomed in size 
during the 1930s and 1940s, becoming synonymous with New Deal reforms and later the 
bureaucratic wartime intrusions,” wrote David Reinhard.84 Roosevelt adviser-turned critic James 
Warburg said in a 1934 speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations that the American 
voters should stand against the New Deal, instead of “opening the door to the ideas and ideals as 
foreign to most of us as the German goose step or the Fascist salute.”85 Ogden Mills, Hoover’s 
Treasury Secretary, agreed; Mills, speaking to the New York State Young Republicans Clubs, 
cited a New Hersey tailor imprisoned for charging more than the NRA code price and said, “This 
man went to prison without even a trial by jury, not for violating a specific criminal statutes, 
Federal or State, but for violating an executive edict or decree… That, my friends, is tyranny.”86 
Opposed to the economic tyranny of the New Deal, conservative business interests, motivated by 
both their ideology and pocketbooks, founded the American Liberty League and later the 
Foundation for Economic Education to push a laissez-faire economic agenda to counter the 
interventionist economic policies dominant under Roosevelt.87 At the same time, conservative 
                                                          
84 David W. Reinhard, The Republican Right since 1945, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pg. 2. 
85 Howard Wood, "NEW DEAL LEADS TO A DICTATOR, SAYS WARBURG." Chicago Daily Tribune, October 5, 1934, 
http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/181626076?accountid=14244. 
86 Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. "NEW DEAL TREND TOWARD 'TYRANNY' SCORED BY MILLS," New York Times, 
May 20, 1934. 
http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/101243071?accountid=14244. 
87 Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan, 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009). 
Ong, 30 
 
Republicans and southern Democrats worked together in a ramshackle coalition to oppose New 
Deal legislation in Congress, overcoming their partisan differences.88 
After World War II, the Old Right also opposed the rise of presidential power in foreign 
affairs, spurred on by new post-war international commitments and the threat of communism. 
Taft wrote in 1951, “'There can be no question that the executive departments have claimed more 
and more power over the field of foreign policy at the same time that the importance of foreign 
policy in its effect upon every feature of American life has steadily increased.” Taft expressed 
concern that “the President will become a complete dictator in the entire field of foreign policy” 
and this power would bleed into the domestic sphere, leaving Congress a rump branch of 
government.89 Aaron Friedberg puts this opposition to American state-building during the early 
Cold War in the context of traditional American anti-statism dating back to Thomas Jefferson; 
describing Republican opposition to Truman’s defense policies, Friedberg writes, “The essence 
of the Republican critique was clear enough: rising taxes, expanding expenditures, a ballooning 
federal bureaucracy, and increasing government regulations and controls were tilting the balance 
of national power toward Washington, and within Washington toward the executive branch.”90 
Republicans took explicit steps to limit presidential power; capitalizing on their brief control of 
Congress after World War II, Republicans passed the 22nd Amendment to limit presidents to two 
terms, passing the most explicit and binding restriction on presidential power in decades.91 
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At this time, J. William Fulbright, Rhodes Scholar, and Arkansas Senator was a rising 
star in politics and foreign affairs. He, like many liberal internationalists, firmly opposed the neo-
isolationists of the Old Right, like Sen. Robert Taft and Sen. John Bricker. In doing so, Fulbright 
became a classic Cold Warrior and would see the presidency expanded to manage the communist 
threat.92 When Sen. Bricker proposed a constitutional amendment to limit the president’s power 
to make foreign agreements without consulting Congress, Fulbright opposed it. To him, global 
circumstances had brought about “a period of inevitable and unpredictable change,” and he 
argued that the proposal, which sought to reassert Congress’ prerogative over foreign affairs, 
would throttle the presidency and undermine the Constitution.93 However, liberalism’s faith in 
the honest and effective use of executive power, exemplified by Fulbright, would tremble and 
collapse as the United States moved deeper and deeper into Indochina. 
 This pattern of Republican opposition to the expansion of the federal government and 
executive authority continued into the 1960s. Unlike anti-statist politics early in the Cold War, 
opposition to the Great Society was far more regionally and racially-based. In his book The 
Emerging Republican Majority, Kevin Phillips noted, “Within the House of Representatives, 
most votes on Great Society have straddled old Civil War divisions…” and that “Democratic 
‘Great Society’ programs aligned that party with many Negro demands…”94 Yet, opposition to 
the Great Society hit on the same anti-statist and anti-executive notes as previous criticism. 
Ronald Reagan Speaks Out Against Socialized Medicine, a 1961 LP put out with the support of 
the American Medical Association, was a strong critique of big government; noting that 1/5 of 
the United States’ industrial capacity was owned by the government, Reagan warned of coming 
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“federal programs that would invade every area of freedom as we have known it in this country.” 
Reagan continued that if the listener didn’t call their Congressman, “one of these days, you and I 
are going to spend our sunset years telling our children and our children’s children what it once 
was like in America when men were free.”95 Goldwater took a more personal tact during the 
1964 campaign when describing Johnson’s cajoling of Congress; he said, “This is nothing less 
than totalitarian philosophy- the principle that the end justifies the means.”96 
Congress Awakens 
 It would not take long for anti-executive criticism of the Vietnam War to drown out anti-
executive criticism of the Great Society, resurrect Congress’s power over foreign affairs, and 
sow doubts about the primacy of the executive branch. The seeds of congressional discontent 
were sown when passing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution; only two senators, Wayne Morse (D-OR) 
and Ernest Gruening (D-AK) voted against the resolution, hitting notes which would become 
familiar over the next decade. Sen. Morse said, “A constitutional principle is involved. It is 
dangerous to give to any President an unchecked power, after the passage of a joint resolution, to 
make war…. In effect, you are trying to get around article I, section 8, by amending the 
Constitution by way of a joint resolution.”97 Yet the resolution, presented as an emergency 
measure necessitated by an attack on U.S. forces, passed overwhelmingly, showing how 
perceived emergencies can drive government policy. In 1965, as Johnson escalated the war with 
Operation Rolling Thunder beyond what Senator Fulbright believed authorized by the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution, the liberal anti-war Senate Foreign Relations fought back, holding televised 
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hearings on the war in open defiance of their president and party. In 1966, polls showed 
Americans narrowly in favor of Johnson’s Vietnam policies, which ranked as the most important 
issue facing the nation, although war support would decline dramatically in the next few years, 
destroying Johnson’s presidency.98 
 Criticism of executive power was a key component of anti-war liberals’ criticism of 
Vietnam. For instance, in 1967, Sen. Fulbright, then a leading anti-war senator far removed from 
his deference to the executive during debates on the Bricker amendment, introduced a resolution 
to prevent the executive branch from making foreign agreements without consulting Congress, 
lest foreign entanglements ensnare the United States in another war.99 However, because debates 
over executive power are often thinly disguised debates over executive policies, Nixon’s 
invasion of Cambodia brought presidential power to the forefront. In, April 1971 McGovern-
Hartfield amendment threatened to cut off funding for forces in Vietnam to mandate a 
withdrawal within two months. Although the amendment failed, the Cooper-Church amendment, 
which eliminated funding for troops in Cambodia after two months and prohibited expanding the 
war into Thailand and Laos, passed; Nixon withdrew U.S. forces by the two-month deadline and 
claimed the mission was accomplished, marking a dramatic expansion in Congress’s authority 
over foreign policy.100  Meanwhile, the executive branch defended the president’s war powers; 
Nicholas Katzenbach testified to the Senate in 1967 that, “under our constitutional system the 
source of an effective foreign policy is Presidential power.” He said, “His is a responsibility born 
of the need for speed and decisiveness in an emergency. … To him flow all of the vast 
intelligence and information connected with national security. The President, of necessity, has a 
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preeminent responsibility in this field.”101 Katzenbach noted to Chairman Sam Ervin that the 
president has ultimate authority over national security in an emergency, the definition of which, 
Ervin retorted, had greatly expanded in the case of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.102 
Fears of unchecked government power wielded by the president also affected the 
domestic sphere, where privacy concerns during the mid-1960s also pushed Congress to protect 
individual liberty from the rapidly widening government ambit. In 1965, LBJ announced a 
National Data Bank to streamline federal databases, improving government efficiency as part of 
the Great Society. This met with unexpected backlash; the New York Times ran the headline “The 
U.S. Central Data Bank: Would it threaten your privacy?”103 Congress quickly held hearings on 
the proposal, spearheaded by the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and 
Procedure, chaired by Sen. Edward V. Long (D-MO), and the Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights, chaired by Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (DNC). During hearings underway in 
1971, Sen. Ervin noted, “The replies we are receiving are astounding, not only for the 
information they are disclosing but for the attitudes displayed toward the right of Congress and 
the American people to know what Government is doing.”104 The House Government Operations 
Committee’s Special Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy, led by Rep. Cornelius Gallagher (D-
NJ) also blasted the proposal; Gallagher stated the National Data Bank “would be paid for at the 
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far greater expense of weakening the right to privacy of all American citizens. Surely this is too 
exorbitant a price to pay for an economized filing system.” The news media concurred, running 
headlines alluding to ‘Big Brother’ and a ‘Peeping Tom’.105 In his 1964 book The Naked Society, 
journalist Vance Packard observed how technological advancements in data storage, polygraph 
tests, hidden microphones, and computing power threatened American’s privacy. He wrote, 
“There are banks of giant memory machines that conceivably could recall in a few seconds every 
pertinent action — including failures, embarrassments or possibly incriminating acts — from the 
lifetime of each citizen.”106 In stark contrast to the liberalism of Franklin Roosevelt, an allergy to 
concentrated power was key to liberalism in the late 1960s and early 70s, whether it be in 
Vietnam or at home. 
Meanwhile, the Senate aimed to reassert its treaty power by attacking executive 
agreements, which often had the gravity of foreign treaties but did not require the Senate’s two-
thirds approval. Often, Congress would remain ignorant of these agreements, which germinated 
in the bowels of the executive branch. In 1969, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-MO) set up a 
subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to study executive agreements and see 
how concentrated foreign relations had become in the executive branch. He was alarmed at the 
scope of U.S. security assistance and deployments abroad, almost all of which Congress had not 
endorsed but merely funded with vague assurances from presidents. For instance, in 1971, 
32,000 U.S. troops were stationed in Thailand, along with seven air bases, all of which Congress 
had not approved. U.S. security assistance across the developing world, nuclear weapons 
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deployments, and security commitments which might enmesh the United States in another 
Vietnam were rampant during the Cold War, all without Congress’s knowledge.107 
These inquiries marked an important trend in the late 1960s and early 1970s: liberal 
Senate committees using their investigative powers to expose the extent of presidential power 
and reassert Congress’s authority in a wide array of policy-making. As Congress reasserted itself 
against a seemingly out-of-control presidency, it ran headlong into a government which for four 
decades had managed the routine business on extraordinary legal grounds. Now, Congress would 
have to reckon with the massive stores of accumulated emergency powers and find a way to 
eliminate them. 
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CHAPTER 2: The Senate Strikes Back 
 
On Monday, June 5, 1972, ten days after Nixon visited Moscow for the first time and 
twelve days before the Watergate break-in, a tiny Senate subcommittee held a revelatory hearing. 
At 10 AM, Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense, and Adm. Thomas Moorer, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified in what is now the Dirksen Senate Building to a mostly empty 
Appropriations Subcommittee meeting; only Senator William Proxmire (D-WI), the chairman, 
and the elderly anti-war Senator Allen Ellender (D-LA) were present. Such an insignificant 
meeting did not normally demand more attention than that. 
Laird, a close friend of Proxmire since their service in the Wisconsin state legislature in 
the 1950s, was supposed to testify on the President’s foreign military assistance program, which 
totaled a sizeable $6 billion.108 The hearing, Laird’s last before the Appropriations 
Subcommittee, opened cordially, with acknowledgment of each other’s friendship and years of 
public service. For a handful of minutes, Laird testified to the need to expand security assistance 
funding to allies and partners around the world to defend the free world and keep the peace, 
which was a key part of the Nixon Doctrine. It was, as most Congressional testimony seems, 
exceedingly dull, with a discussion of foreign currency reserve requirements and budget cuts.109  
Yet there was a pressing issue which Proxmire addressed immediately after Laird 
finished his opening statement. In the heat of the 1972 election, several senators, members of, as 
Proxmire emphasized, “this co-equal branch of government,” had pledged to cease funding the 
unpopular Vietnam War in order to force President Nixon to withdraw. It was a widely popular 
position among liberals, so much so that both Senators Humphrey and McGovern, the two 
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leading candidates in the Democratic primary had adopted it. McGovern would clinch the 
nomination a month later. 
So, Proxmire asked, what would you do if we failed to pass a defense budget by June 30? 
Laird responded,  
“If there is not any action 'by the Senate at all on even a continuing resolution, then the 
only legislation which would permit us to operate would be the deficiency authorization 
legislation which was passed at the time of the Civil War which gives to the Department of 
Defense and to the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the United States, the authority to 
obligate on a deficiency basis for the subsistence of our military personnel and for other 
requirements needed to support those military people.”110 
Proxmire was deeply “troubled.” In the nearly empty committee room, the Secretary of Defense 
was telling him the power of the purse, the almighty sacrosanct constitutional power of Congress 
could be usurped by the President to continue a war against Congress’ wishes using an obscure 
Civil War-era law.  
The law in question was the 1861 Feed and Forage Act, which originally allowed Union 
cavalry to buy supplies while in the field when Congress was out of session.111 Yet this was not 
some archaic legislation dusted off by Nixon’s lawyers to continue the Vietnam War; Congress 
had twice recognized the law by referencing it in previous Defense Appropriation Acts and the 
President had invoked it five times in the previous ten years, often as a stopgap measure between 
defense budgets. In fact, since 1968, the Secretary of Defense had notified Congress every time 
he had invoked this law. Yet, like so many presidential powers during the Vietnam Era, it was 
now being turned against Congress.112  
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“What power does Congress really have here?” Proxmire inquired. “It is said that 
Congress has the power of the purse. You are telling me that if we cut off, the President can now 
act under a deficiency appropriation bill?” Laird told him yes, that the law lasted indefinitely and 
there was no limit to the amount of money the Department of Defense could allocate without 
Congress. In fact, the military had used the law in 1968, 1969 and 1972 to fund operations in 
Vietnam and Cambodia. If Congress wished to cease funding for the Vietnam War, they would 
have to actively reassert their constitutional prerogative by repealing the Feed and Forage Act, 
which Laird said he opposed.113 The Pentagon would likely force Congress to do just that, The 
next year, when Congress threatened to slash funds for Nixon’s bombing of Cambodia, Laird’s 
successor, Elliot Richardson, testified that “[w]e can find the money… [w]e can invoke the [feed 
and forage] authority.”114 
The testimony shocked Proxmire so much that he wrote to the Comptroller General of the 
United States, who confirmed that the President, upon determining that such an action is 
necessary, could invoke the Feed and Forage Act to supply military forces without any input 
from Congress. But even more surprising to Proxmire was that Congress had routinely delegated 
this power to the President, year after year, in defense appropriations acts.115 This broad 
discretionary power, in government and nation split by the rice paddies and napalm a world 
away, now seemed reckless and unconstitutional. Although this committee meeting seemed 
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insignificant, it would set in motion one of the largest revocations of presidential power in 
American history. 
This exchange provided the impetus for the bipartisan Special Committee on the 
Termination of the National Emergency, an eight-person committee that sought to investigate the 
President’s statutory authority and propose prudent reforms. In its four-year tenure, the 
committee, chaired by ardent champions of Congress’s prerogative, sought to aggressively limit 
presidential emergency power, and in doing so, reclaim authority for Congress and curb the 
federal government’s emergency authority. The committee signaled a bipartisan distrust of 
centralized executive power, a defining theme of 1970s politics. 
Establishing the Committee 
Two days later, on June 7, the Committee on Foreign Relations held a closed hearing on 
S.R. 304, which would establish a bipartisan special committee to research and remedy the 
lingering 1950 national emergency, which Truman had declared during the Korean War.116 The 
committee reported favorably on the bill six days later and it quickly passed the Senate; by 
September, the Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency was born. 
Sen. Frank Church became the Democratic co-chair of the committee and Charles 
Mathias became the Republican co-chair. Church, a lone Democrat from a sea of Idaho 
Republicans, had served in the Senate since 1956 when he joined the body as the youngest 
senator. Tall and trim with a boyish face, Church quickly earned a spot on the Foreign Relations 
Committee and became known for his rhetorical skills.117 One of the earliest and loudest critics 
of the Vietnam War, Church proposed ending aid to Vietnam in 1963 and immediately wanted 
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an investigation into the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in August 1964.118 No fan of a strong executive, 
in 1970, Church gave a speech titled “Of Presidents and Caesars,” denouncing the concentration 
of presidential war powers as a prelude to a dictatorship. He adamantly opposed presidential 
impoundment, sponsored the Cooper-Church amendment to end the Vietnam War, and 
sponsored the Formosa Resolution’s repeal.119 Within a liberal Senate, Church was one of the 
biggest opponents of the Cold War and the national security state. 
Mathias, a Maryland Republican, was perhaps Nixon’s greatest Republican opponent. In 
1969, White House aide H.R. Haldeman, looking to pressure moderate Republicans into 
supporting Nixon’s policy on Vietnam, ordered a letter-writing and phone call campaign to blast 
Mathias for lack of fidelity to the President.120 Noted for his opposition to the Vietnam War, 
Mathias was by far and away the most anti-Nixon Republican in the Senate in terms of votes 
cast.121 After Nixon’s 1970 purge of liberal Republican Senator Charles Goodell from the party, 
it was rumored he might do the same to Mathias, who had opposed two Nixon Supreme Court 
nominees and backed a Democratic plan for government financing of campaigns. A Washington 
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Post article read, “The senator’s liberalism and tendency to bolt party lines have bred animosity 
in the inner sanctum.”122 So tense was their relationship that Mathias later recounted that Nixon 
reputedly placed him on the enemies list.123  
Spurred on by presidential war powers running rampant in Vietnam and Cambodia, 
Charles Mathias had repeatedly attempted to end the 1950 national emergency before Melvin 
Laird’s testimony. In May 1971 he proposed a joint congressional committee, which would have 
combined House and Senate members, to tackle the issue. Mathias had introduced bills to After 
the Foreign Relations Committee provided feedback on the bill in February 1972, Mathias 
introduced a revised version in May, which ultimately passed after the shocking exchange 
between Proxmire and Laird gave extra attention to the President’s statutory powers.124 The new 
bill created a bipartisan special committee of eight members to tackle the issue of the 1950 
national emergency, a lingering legal device spanning the entirety of the Cold War. 
Because he was in the majority, Church could have simply managed the committee as the 
sole chair but chose the unorthodox arrangement of two co-chairs to emphasize the committee’s 
bipartisanship on such an important issue. Mathias later likened the two co-chairs to the old 
vaudeville act “Alphonse and Gaston,” where two friends collide as they walk through a door at 
the same time.125 At the nearly unanimous recommendation of Republican senators, he named 
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Mathias, with whom he repealed the Formosa Resolution, as his co-chair.126 The two co-chairs 
then chose the remaining six committee members: Philip Hart (D-MI), Claiborne Pell (D-RI), 
Adlai E. Stevenson (D-IL), Clifford Case (R-NJ), Clifford Hansen (R-WY), and James Pearson 
(R-KS). While the Nixon administration counted Hansen as voting with them 93.5% of the time, 
every other committee member was either a liberal Democrat or a moderate Republican.127 The 
special committee was very much an outgrowth of Fulbright’s Foreign Relations Committee, 
which supplied half of the special committee’s membership.128 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee under Chairman Fulbright had perhaps the most 
antagonistic relationship with the White House of any legislative committee. The War Powers 
Resolution, a child of the Foreign Relations Committee, is a prime example of this. Passed in 
1973 under the shadow of Vietnam, the Resolution emerged from liberal Democratic Senators as 
a check on the President’s ability to bring the nation into a war. However, Nixon saw the bill as 
an unconstitutional assault on the presidency and vetoed it. He wrote the bill was 
“unconstitutional and dangerous” and would “would seriously undermine this nation's ability to 
act decisively and convincingly in times of international crisis.”129 Nevertheless, Congress 
overrode his veto and passed the bill anyway.130 
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Their mandate was “to conduct a study and investigation with respect to the matter of 
terminating the national emergency proclaimed by the President of the United States on 
December 16, 1950.” To accomplish this goal, the committee was to consult with the executive 
branch, consider any unintended consequences of terminating the national emergency, and to 
investigate terminating certain delegated emergency powers.131 Put simply, the committee was 
intended “to restore the constitutional balance between the Presidency and the Congress.”132 
Although the Committee officially assembled in the fall of 1972, it took several more 
months for it to accrue a staff and meeting place. William Miller, a former-diplomat and now-
staffer for Senator Cooper, became the committee’s Chief Counsel and Tom Dine, a staffer for 
Church, became the committee’s second professional staff member. Both had cut their teeth 
working for Democrats on the Foreign Relations Committee and had strong anti-Vietnam bona 
fides. Additionally, Martha Mecham and Audrey Hatry served as the committee’s clerks. 
Originally, the committee was to report its findings by January 1973, this was when their 
research began. 
The committee had a fraught relationship with the Nixon Administration. On January 17, 
1973, the two co-chairs met with Attorney General Kleindienst, who agreed to cooperate and 
assigned Jack Goldklang of the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel to work directly with the 
committee Lawyers from the State Department and Defense Department consulted the 
committee as well.133 Tom Korologos, a White House Congressional Liaison in the White 
House, represented the Nixon administration on this issue. However, on January 17, 1973, 
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Korologos reported to Kissinger that the special committee could be “one of our major Foreign 
Policy battles in the Senate this year.”134 The committee could hold hearings, had subpoena 
powers, and a budget of $175,000 for their first year, which although smaller than most 
committee budgets alarmed Korologos and his colleagues, as it enabled the committee to take 
substantial and public actions. The liberal committee staff of Bill Miller and Tom Dine, 
combined with the importance of the Trading with the Enemy Act to containing communism, 
made the committee an object of automatic suspicion in the centralized Nixon White House.135 
Bill Miller was particularly despised in certain Republican circles; when Church later appointed 
him to the select committee investigating intelligence activities, later known as the Church 
Committee, Republicans were apoplectic. To them, Miller was part of “a ‘cabal’ who take a 
revisionist view of the cold war and push for reduced defense expenditures and a softer foreign 
policy.” During a 1969 fight over the anti-ballistic missile treaty, State Department officials 
became so frustrated with Miller that they insisted he no longer attend meetings on the issue.136  
 The special committee operated on a set of basic assumptions that distinguished them 
from their political opponents. First, they believed that the presidency had grown too powerful 
over the past few decades, and blamed a mixture of crises and congressional inaction. As 
Mathias said on the Senate floor, “I believe that we do face today a national emergency - even a 
paradoxically continuous one. It emerged during the Depression and has been with us for several 
decades. It is a crisis that throws our whole system of Constitutional government into jeopardy. 
This emergency-if I may use the term so loosely is the atrophy of Congress.”137 This was a key 
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connection between Vietnam and the National Emergencies Act; many who opposed Nixon’s 
bombing of Cambodia because it was an illegal usurpation of the congressional war power, 
which was itself the product of decades of crisis and congressional negligence.138 For Mathias, 
the same argument applied to national emergencies. Mathias lambasted Roosevelt’s 1933 
emergency declaration as beginning an era of permanent emergencies devoid of congressional 
input, which President Nixon had continued and even expanded. For example, he cited Nixon’s 
unilateral decision to remove the U.S. from the gold standard and freeze certain public 
employees’ wages to fight inflation in 1971. Mathias stated that because the emergency had been 
continuous since 1933, emergency powers had accumulated and become institutionalized in the 
executive.139 To the committee, congressional lethargy had produced an emboldened executive 
which it was their mission to humble. 
 Their second assumption was that the president’s powers were a threat to American civil 
liberties and constitutional order. Mathias complained that Johnson’s 1968 use of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act was a tactic to avoid working with Congress by usurping their legislative 
authority. Without the 1950 national emergency, “these measures clearly represent an 
unconstitutional encroachment on legislative authority.”140 At the beginning of the committee, 
the senators knew of 200 emergency laws giving the president extraordinary powers. They 
believed these laws granted powers which “infringe on so many crucial constitutional rights and 
principles that collectively they may be seen as placing our system of democratic government in 
jeopardy.” But more importantly, “these measures threaten the constitutional balance of powers” 
between the presidency and Congress. The senators believed the Constitution did not allow for a 
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state of emergency to become the norm and shuddered to think of the doors this emergency 
opened.141 
 Third, Congress could and must check the presidency by reasserting itself in areas 
seemingly absorbed by the presidency, such as emergency powers. Since 1937, when the 
Supreme Court adopted a deferential stance towards the New Deal, the committee found that 
“the Court has been extremely reluctant to invalidate any congressional delegation of economic 
powers to the President.”142 What Congress had given, Congress could take away, and since the 
Court was unlikely to weigh in, the burden fell solely on Congress. The committee frequently 
cited Justice Jackson’s concurrence in the 1953 Steel Seizure case, where he wrote, “We may say 
that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress 
itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.”143  
The Committee Begins Its Work 
 When the committee began its work on January 6, 1973, its first task was research.144 The 
committee aimed to catalog all laws operating during national emergencies and determine which 
national emergencies, besides the 1950 national emergency declared by Truman, were still in 
effect. Committee staff members Tom Dine and Bill Miller set out to catalog all existing laws 
related to emergency powers, but found that nowhere in government was there a comprehensive 
list of statutes active in national emergencies or a list of relevant executive orders. Based on 
previous catalogs produced by the Defense Department and Office of Emergency Planning, the 
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committee knew of at least 200 special powers accrued by the President, including Johnson’s use 
of emergency economic authority to control American investments abroad in 1968 and Nixon’s 
suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act in 1971.145 However, the committee had no clear 
understanding of these 200 powers’ scope or longevity.146 
 The committee received a much-needed boost when in early 1973, the staff discovered 
the entire U.S. Code digitized on an Air Force base in Colorado. When Church heard the news, 
he was so ecstatic, he remembered that he jumped up and down with glee.147 Now, the 
committee could search the terms, “emergency,” “national emergency,” “crisis,” “invasion,” and 
several other keywords to compile a comprehensive list of emergency laws. Naturally, the task of 
sifting through this catalog fell to an intern. Because some wartime powers lacked any 
discernable trigger words, the committee also searched all 87 volumes of U.S. statutes by hand, 
working in two separate teams with staff from the Library of Congress.148 The staff then checked 
the filtered search results against previous catalogs of emergency powers to ensure their 
accuracy.149 The disorganized jumble of emergency declarations and powers provided another 
justification for the committee: the chaotic legal mess could impede swift action in a true crisis. 
In some cases, the President could declare an emergency, in others Congress could, and in 
others, they could act jointly. Sometimes cabinet officials could declare national emergencies 
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without consulting the President or Congress. This irregularity drove the committee to create 
uniform mechanisms for emergency powers; Much like the War Powers Resolution, the National 
Emergencies Act would establish procedures as a way of hemming presidential power.150 It is 
ironic that computers, which Senators feared would expand government power at the expense of 
citizens’ liberties, helped check that same government power. 
 The committee held three hearings to consult experts and executive branch officials on 
how to reform emergency powers. The hearings were not large public affairs, especially since the 
Watergate hearings dwarfed them in the headlines. The first hearing, which occurred on April 11 
and 12, 1973, two weeks after the last U.S. soldier left Vietnam and just over two weeks before 
Nixon fired White House Counsel John Dean, invited academics to discuss the constitutional 
issues of emergency powers. Major names in the scholarly literature like Professors Robert 
Rankin, Cornelius Cotter, Malcolm Smith, and Gerhard Casper testified. Dr. Adrian Fisher, who 
wrote the original 1950 national emergency, also testified, providing first-hand experience to the 
proliferation of presidential emergency powers. 
 At this first hearing, the committee first announced its astonishing revelations. They had 
found 580 statutes delegating the President extraordinary authority over American citizens’ lives 
during national emergencies.151 These laws gave the president “a vast range of powers, which 
taken all together, confer the power to rule this country without reference to normal 
constitutional processes.”152 Even more surprising was that the United States had been in a state 
of emergency since March 6, 1933, when President Roosevelt declared an emergency to enforce 
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a bank holiday during the Great Depression.153 To the committee, crises drove this 
aggrandizement of powers into the President’s hands. With the Great Depression, World War II 
and the Korean War, the body of laws grew bit by bit. The committee found distinct categories 
of laws: first, those which had become part of everyday government life, and thus should become 
permanent; second, those which were clearly obsolete and should be repealed; third, those which 
“because of their far-reaching impact, should be recast to provide the public with protection 
against possible abuses of power.”154 
 Some laws struck the committee staff and members as particularly egregious. 10 USC 
712 allowed the president, if they consider it in the national interest, to dispatch soldiers to any 
country to assist in “military matters” which seemed an enormous surrender of Congress’ war 
powers.155 Another, 18 USC 1383 allowed the President, the Secretary of the Army, or any 
military officer designated by the President, to declare any area in the United States a military 
zone and imprison anyone for a year for entering or leaving that zone. While Congress had 
repealed the Emergency Detention Act two years before the committee began, 18 USC 1383 still 
allowed the President to detain citizens for possibly arbitrary reasons.156 Some laws seemed 
pointless. 46 USC 249a authorized the Secretary of Commerce to issue a distinctive service 
ribbon to any “master, officer or member of the crew of any United States ship” who had served 
after June 1950 during a war or national emergency.157 Some laws seemed sensible in emergency 
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situations, but absurd when the emergency had passed. For instance, in 1973, the Secretary of 
Commerce could requisition any vessel any U.S. citizen’s watercraft, so long as they provided 
the owner with just compensation.158 Emergencies also had a significant effect beyond statutes. 
Consulting Professor John T. Elliff, the committee staff found the FBI’s domestic surveillance, 
which the Church Committee would later investigate, depended on Executive orders pursuant to 
the 1939 declaration of national emergency.  
 At the second hearing, which fell on the morning of Tuesday, July 24, the committee 
consulted former Attorneys General. Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General under President 
Johnson, testified, and his successor, Ramsey Clark. Retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. 
Clark, who ruled on the important Steel Seizure Case, testified as well since he served as 
Attorney General under from 1945 to 1949. The third hearing focused on former members of the 
Nixon Administration, who testified on how to best hold the President accountable for 
emergency actions. On November 28, the two witnesses testified. The first was Erwin Griswold, 
who served as Solicitor General under Nixon, and while a law professor, was instrumental in 
drafting the 1935 Federal Register Act, which required publishing presidential dicta to improve 
government transparency. The other witness was Elliot Richardson, the Attorney General whom 
Nixon had fired only a month prior during the Saturday Night Massacre. In all, the hearings 
provided important expert testimony which elucidated the executive’s viewpoints and provided 
expert advice to the senators. 
 Senator Church wrote, “The 2,000-year-old problem of how a legislative body in a 
democratic republic may extend extraordinary powers for use by the executive during times of 
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great crisis and dire emergency… has not yet been resolved in this country.”159 So, during the 
course of its research and hearings, the committee set out to resolve this problem and looked to 
other nations for inspiration. Great Britain during the Second World War offered a promising 
model; Parliament would only extend the state of emergency for 30 days at a time, but had a 
massive “stand-by reservoir of emergency powers to enable the executive to act swiftly and 
effectively … in both war and peace.”160 This model was particularly appealing because it 
offered Congress created control over and knowledge of national security issues. The committee 
also looked to the Weimar Republic as an example to avoid and a reason for strict Congressional 
diligence. Under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, the President could assume dictatorial 
powers when public safety required it. Between 1919 and 1925, the German President used these 
powers 136 times. Although the German President was required to report all dictatorial measures 
to the Reichstag, this happened only three times between 1919 and 1932, as the Reichstag, 
divided and squabbling, could not challenge Presidents with substantial popular mandates. This 
legislative laxity made Hitler’s use of Article 48 an easy legal tool with which to claim absolute 
power. For this reason, the 1948 Bonn Constitution abolished not only emergency powers but 
eliminated an elected presidency, in order to prevent future abuses.161 This provided a terrifying 
example to the special committee of the need for legislative oversight and the dangers of 
constitutional laxity. 
                                                          
159 U.S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, Emergency Powers 
States: Provisions of Federal Law Now In Effect Delegating To The Executive Extraordinary Authority In Time Of 
National Emergency, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, Committee Print 98-405, pg. 6. 
160 US Congress, Senate, Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, PART 2-Views of 
Former Attorney Generals, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, pg. 503. 
161 US Congress, Senate, Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, PART 1-Constitutional 
Questions Concerning Emergency Powers, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, pg. 86-87. 
Ong, 53 
 
The committee found three possible approaches to reforming national emergencies: (a) 
outright repeal of all emergency statutes, (b) relegating all emergency provisions to a state of 
dormancy to be used in future emergencies, or (c) maintaining emergency provisions in the 
United States Code but for use only in states of emergency declared in accordance” with 
specified oversight procedures.162 After some debate, the committee opted for the third approach 
to avoid any major clashes with the executive branch, even if it meant compromising on the 
bill’s substance.163 This produced legislation similar to the War Powers Resolution, which 
established procedures for previously unconstrained presidential behavior. Ultimately, designing 
an emergency powers regime was a balancing act. As William Miller, the committee staff 
director wrote, “If emergency powers are used too late, a democratic state might be destroyed, 
when the timely use of emergency powers possibly could have saved it. If used arbitrarily and 
capriciously, its use could degenerate into the worst form of dictatorship.”164 The committee saw 
themselves as being dangerously out of balance and aimed to right the ship of state. 
The committee decided to investigate which emergency laws were necessary and which 
could be safely repealed. So, the committee staff sent letters to every government agency and 
every legislative committee to ask which of the 470 law they felt were obsolete, which they felt 
could be improved, and which should be cast as permanent statutes. The Office of Management 
and Budget under Roy Ash managed the process of coordinating every executive agency to work 
with the special committee. However, executive branch agencies appeared fairly unwilling to let 
their emergency authorities slip away. Of every executive branch department, only the 
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Department of Agriculture said more emergency laws under its purview were obsolete than not. 
In fact, the Department of Defense, which exercised by far the most emergency powers, said the 
committee should only repeal one of their emergency powers.165 The conflicts over power 
between the White House and Congress was replicated here between the bureaucracy and 
Congress. Now that the committee had identified the obsolete laws, in the summer of 1974, they 
began to draft a bill to end the unending emergencies. 
The 1970s and the Presidency 
 The committee’s perceived mission fits into the broader narratives about executive power 
and distrust of government pervasive during the late 1960s and 1970s. In 1964, the Pew 
Research Center found 77% of Americans had trust in their government. By 1970, it had slipped 
to 54%. By 1974, it had plummeted to 36%.166 Daniel Moynihan, a Nixon aide and future 
senator, wrote in 1970, “The primary problem of American society continues to be that of the 
eroding authority of the principal institutions of government and society.” To him, the 
presidency was the most beleaguered institution, despite some patching up by Nixon, due to the 
Vietnam War. Importantly, Moynihan saw education level as a critical indicator of voters’ 
distrust toward a strong presidency, indicative of the coming intellectual charge against 
presidential power.167 The esteemed opinion writer, James Reston, concurred; in 1973 he wrote, 
“There has been a sharp decline in respect for authority in the United States as a result of the 
[Vietnam] war—a decline in respect not only for the civil authority of government but also for 
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the moral authority of the schools, the universities, the press, the church, and even the family.”168 
The Vietnam War, which includes the My Lai massacre, the Pentagon Papers, and Nixon’s secret 
bombing of Cambodia, was a key driver of declining trust in government. As H.R. Haldeman 
told Nixon in the Oval Office, what the average American would take away from the Pentagon 
Papers was that, “you can't trust the government; you can't believe what they say; and you can't 
rely on their judgment; and the – the implicit infallibility of presidents, which has been an 
accepted thing in America, is badly hurt by this, because it shows that people do things the 
President wants to do even though it's wrong, and the President can be wrong."169 
 Declining trust in public institutions translated directly into suspicion of institutions’ 
powers. Scholars like Bruce Schulman and Julian Zelizer have shown this distrust came from 
several places, such as the failure of campaign finance reform and the growth of the Sunbelt to 
produce the ephemeral and pervasive “crisis of confidence” which covered the decade.170 Like 
Vietnam, campaign finance reform, or demographic shifts, Watergate inspired suspicion of 
government and a desire to limit governmental power. During the Watergate impeachment 
hearings in the House Judiciary Committee, Rep. Walter Flowers [D-AL] said, “The power of 
the presidency is a public trust, and the people must be able to believe and rely on their 
president.” To Flowers, “… if the people cannot know that their President is candid and truthful 
with them, then the very basis of government is undermined.”171 As historian Theodore 
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Borstelmann argues, “The ultimate message embedded in Watergate and also in the deceptive 
Vietnam policies of the Johnson administration was simply not to trust government – ultimately 
a conservative attitude that rejected four decades of New Deal activist management from 
Washington.”172 It’s no accident that since Watergate, eight of 11 Democratic and Republican 
presidential nominees have run as outsiders, not to mention the uniquely popular independent 
Ross Perot.173  
 Some critics even proposed amending the presidency outright. In 1974, an American 
Enterprise Institute panel discussion chaired by esteemed constitutional law professor Alexander 
Bickel debated whether or not the president should have a single six-year term or perhaps the 
unitary executive be divided into a committee of executives.174 In 1973, historian Barbara 
Tuchman wrote a New York Times op-ed entitled “Should we abolish the presidency?” She 
wrote, “Owing to the steady accretion of power in the executive over the last forty years, the 
institution of the Presidency is not now functioning as the Constitution intended, and this 
malfunction has become perilous to the state.” Tuchman agreed with the committee that 
Congress had failed to check the “natural tendency of an executive to become dictatorial” and 
that a cabinet government can function just as well as a unitary executive during crises.175 
To these critics, the presidency, a formerly noble institution inhabited by FDR, Lincoln, 
and Kennedy, had become a cesspool under Nixon. It is impossible to say definitively whether or 
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not the suspicions of and revolts against presidential power were driven by partisan animosity, 
simple ideology, or a pragmatic response to disturbing new problem. However, the sources of 
this reaction to presidential power are easily identified. This distrust and attacks on the 
presidency and President Nixon came from mainstream liberals but stemmed from the New 
Left’s animosity towards established institutions and concentrated power. Bruce Schulman 
writes, “Liberals believed the political system gave voice to individuals; they just needed to vote, 
participate, stand up and make themselves heard. New Leftists bristled at the naivete of that 
faith.”176 Aside from Congress, the distrust of centralized power came from the New Left and 
later trickled into academia and the press.  
Liberal critics had long cast Nixon as the opportunistic “Tricky Dick,” an oleaginous 
demagogue wielding populism and willing to fight dirty to win. But once Nixon took the White 
House, liberal criticisms morphed into the New Left’s conspiracism and hatred. As David 
Greenberg discusses in Nixon’s Shadow, Nixon’s paranoiac tendencies and the New Left’s 
skepticism towards established institutions formed a vicious cycle, where reprisals and 
retribution spiraled into occasionally physical combat, like when anti-war protestors threw rocks 
and eggs at Nixon’s limo.177 Nixon responded by giving a speech two days later, where he 
condemned “the wave of violence and terrorism by the radical anti-democratic elements in our 
society.” He said the answer to this violence was firmness and the robust application of the 
law.178 and, once told H.R. Haldeman, “We’re up against an enemy, a conspiracy. They’re using 
any means. We’re going to use any means.”179 
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The New Left’s distrust of “The Man” fomented during Vietnam, but Watergate moved 
that distrust towards the political center. Liberal politicians, newsmen, and professors who had 
supported Johnson could not rightly criticize Nixon’s management of the Vietnam War, but they 
could easily lambast Nixon for abuses of power without the New Left’s conspiratorial stylings. 
While liberalism’s revolt against presidential power clearly began over Vietnam in the 1960s, it 
exploded during the Nixon presidency. As the vicious cycle of paranoia and repression between 
New Left activists and Nixon’s White House continued, mainstream liberals came to recognize 
and despise Nixon’s tyrannical behavior. Justice Douglass wrote in a 1972 opinion, “Those who 
register dissent or who petition their governments for redress are subjected to scrutiny by grand 
juries, by the FBI, or even by the military. Their associates are interrogated. Their homes are 
bugged and their telephones are wiretapped. They are befriended by secret government 
informers. Their patriotism and loyalty are questioned.”180 During Watergate, just as Hunter S. 
Thompson likened Nixon to Hitler, so too did George McGovern and Robert Byrd after the 
Saturday Night Massacre.181  
The George McGovern’s 1972 nomination was the peak of New Left convergence with 
the mainstream Democratic Party. Fresh off the destruction of the New Deal coalition in Chicago 
in 1968, the party moved towards an uncertain future as Democrats defected to Richard Nixon 
and the New Left occupied a more prominent place, if only briefly. The 1972 Convention 
featured the first debate on gay rights at a major party convention.182 The party platform was pro-
free speech, sought “to ensure the equitable distribution of wealth and power,” and proposed 
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giving government charters to multinational corporations, strengthening state control over the 
economy. The platform even included a “right to be different,” which celebrated individuality 
and multiculturalism.183 McGovern favored radical cuts to military spending, which helped move 
neo-conservative Democrats towards Nixon.184 While he was far from an SDS member, 
McGovern was the closest thing to it.185 
Both the New Left and the special committee were highly concerned with the threats 
posed by emergency powers run amok. The suspicion towards concentrated power fed both New 
Left conspiracies and Congress’s attempt to reclaim emergency authorities. For instance, the 
leftist newspaper Sanity Now ran stories on how the phony “national emergency” has been in 
effect since Truman and underlies the conspiracy which is the true root of Watergate.186 The 
anarchist Detroit-based newspaper The Fifth Estate also wrote about “Nixon has total power” 
through emergency statutes, making the United States resemble a dictatorship.187 The 
underground paper Berkeley Barb also reported on the committee’s work, describing how “These 
laws not only give a President a nearly dictatorial degree of power – but they also have the effect 
of getting Americans used to the concept of having repressive laws enacted.”188 
                                                          
183 Democratic Party Platforms, 1972 Democratic Party Platform Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273248 
184 Christopher Lydon, “McGovern Offers a Plan To Cut Defense Outlays,” The New York Times, Jan. 20, 1972, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1972/01/20/archives/mcgovern-offers-a-plan-to-cut-defense-outlays.html 
185 Roberta N. Haar, "Insurgency and American Foreign Policy: the case of George McGovern." World Affairs 180, 
no. 2 (2017): 32-61. 
186 Gus Hall, “The Conspiracy that led to Watergate,” Sanity Now, issue 75, August 1, 1973, 
http://voices.revealdigital.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/cgi-
bin/independentvoices?a=d&d=BGIFBCHE19730801.1.13&srpos=6&e=--1971---1977--en-20--1--txt-txIN-
%22national+emergency%22--------------1# 
187 “Nixon has ‘total’ power,” The Fifth Estate, February 2-15, 1974, vol. 8, issue 21, 
http://voices.revealdigital.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/cgi-
bin/independentvoices?a=d&d=BFGJBGD19740202.1.5&srpos=11&e=--1971---1977--en-20--1--txt-txIN-
%22national+emergency%22--------------1# 
188 “Nixon’s Laws Can Can You,” Berkeley Barb, Jan. 4-10, 1974, vol. 18, issue. 25, 
http://voices.revealdigital.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/cgi-
Ong, 60 
 
The repeal of the 1950 Emergency Detention Act, also known as the Concentration Camp 
Law, is indicative of how distrust of government and concern for civil liberties in the late 1960s 
manifested in legislative action. Passed during the height of Cold War hysteria, the law allowed 
the Justice Department to build and maintain detention facilities for anyone suspected of 
espionage or sabotage, should a war break out. The law intentionally paralleled the internment of 
Japanese-Americans during World War II. Although government sold off the six detention sites 
later in the 1950s, when the fear of communist invasion subsided, the law remained on the 
books. However, in 1966, a booklet titled Concentration Camps U.S.A. circulated within New 
Left and African-American communities, stoking concerns about government repression.189 The 
House Committee on Unamerican Activities had even mentioned using the Emergency Detention 
Act to quell overt violence by “Communists and black nationalists” which they considered 
“guerillas.”190 This led Japanese-Americans, many of whom had lived through internment, to 
organize a grassroots movement for the Emergency Detention Act’s repeal. With the law’s repeal 
in 1971, advocates of marginalized groups successfully eliminated a monument to historical 
oppression and asserted themselves as new examples of “loyal Americans.”191 The law was 
repealed, but a similar World War II -era emergency law would become a serious concern for the 
special committee. 
 While academia, namely historians, political scientists, and lawyers, played a central role 
in the development of the presidency in the 20th century, academia played an equally central role 
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in liberalism’s shift away from presidential power in the 1970s, of which the National 
Emergency Act is a prime example. Where once intellectuals embraced the strong executive as 
the benevolent North Star in American politics, by the 1970s, those same intellectuals had moved 
into a post-presidential synthesis. Not only was the presidency no longer the central object of 
analysis but now a strong executive was anathema to American life. Arthur Schlesinger is a 
prime example of this. In 1967, he wrote in his diary, “The irony is that all of us for years have 
been defending the presidential prerogative and regarding the Congress as a drag on policy. It is 
evident that this delight in a strong presidency was based on the fact that, up to now, strong 
presidents in American history have pursued policies of which we approved. We are now 
confronted by the anomaly of a strong presidency using these arguments to pursue a course 
which, so far as I can see, can only lead to disaster.”192 In 1973, he wrote The Imperial 
Presidency chronicling the presidency’s gradual absorption of the power to declare war as well 
as Nixon’s various abuses and peccadillos, coining the phrase which still today describes a rogue 
executive branch.193  
Another example of academia opposing an empowered executive was the 1974 
Conference on Advocacy in the United States of America, which brought out lawyers, political 
scientists, and historians from institutions like Harvard, Columbia, the Council on Foreign 
Relations, the University of Chicago, Yale, Brown and the City University of New York. The 
conference produced a consensus-based report, which included overwhelmingly popular 
recommendations that Congress “participate more fully” in shaping “American use-of-force 
policy than is now the case,” that “No member of the executive branch,” not even the president, 
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“should have the right to refuse to appear before Congress when summoned to testify,” and that a 
special Executive-Legislative group should be formed “immediately to examine the goals of U.S. 
foreign policy and guidelines for the conduct of foreign affairs.”194 When Congress attacked the 
presidency, members brought professors like constitutional law scholars Alexander Bickel, 
Cornelius Cotter, and Arthur S. Miller to testify in hearings. Nixon aide Tom Huston, circulating 
a memo about Congress’ assault on presidential powers, wrote how “the arguments of 
intellectuals” rather than “the rantings of Fulbright” were hemming in the presidency.195 In 1969, 
Vice President Agnew said, “A spirit of national masochism prevails, encouraged by an effete 
corps of impudent snobs who characterize themselves as intellectuals.”196  
 
The humorous 1973 Doonesbury comic strip captures the mix of passionate conviction and feigned 
dispassionate objectivity amongst Watergate observers.197  
  The press, which channeled and amplified the discourse of academia and Congress, 
became highly adversarial towards the presidency during the late 1960s and early 1970s. For 
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instance, Tom Wicker dubbed Nixon an “American Emperor” in The New York Times.198 
Marquis Childs of the Baltimore Sun invoked de Tocqueville’s warnings about “tyranny of the 
majority” to dub Nixon King Richard the First.199 In November 1973, reporter Jack Rodgers 
described how Nixon could use emergency powers specified in classified 1969 memo 
Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances which prescribed plans for squashing 
dissent, casting an anodyne document as a totalitarian power grab.200 The distrust was mutual; 
Nixon’s hostility towards the press is well-known. He told Kissinger in the Oval Office, “Never 
forget: the press is the enemy. The establishment is the enemy. The professors are the enemy. … 
Write that on a blackboard 100 times and never forget it."201 Vice President Agnew bluntly 
criticized the press as being an unelected corps of power brokers manipulating American society 
behind the curtain, an interesting claim mirroring the charges of tyranny leveled against the 
Nixon White House.202 The press was far from shy about striking back. Woodward and 
Bernstein’s All the President’s Men depicted vast abuses of power and rose to the top of the 
bestseller lists. In 1973, John Herbers ran a four-part series in the New York Times on Nixon’s 
expansion and abuses of presidential power.203 
 The National Emergencies Act was a part of this broader distrust of and attack on the 
presidency. Grown out of Watergate and Vietnam, the skepticism of a strong executive not only 
encouraged restraints on the presidency but also opened a window for Congress to reassert itself 
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as a co-equal branch of government. However, the special committee acted strategically to 
ensure they would not face opposition from the Nixon White House. 
After 18 months of reports, hearings, and investigations, the special committee was 
finally ready to restrict the president’s emergency powers. The proposed bill was ready by July 
1974 but Church and Mathias bided their time as the Nixon administration crumbled. As 
Majority Leader Mansfield told Bill Miller, “it is too good and important a bill to let those Nixon 
people get at it.”204 By then, Watergate had already eaten the Nixon administration. As the 
shadow of a hotel at 2650 Virginia Ave loomed over 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., it became 
increasingly clear that the president would face impeachment and possibly be removed from 
office. Soon after the bill was ready, the Supreme Court in US v. Nixon unanimously ordered the 
president to hand over the White House tapes; at this point, 44% of Americans supported 
removing Nixon from office, which would increase to 57% by early August.205 As his support 
among Republican Senators eroded, Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974, elevating Gerald Ford to 
the presidency and opening a new chapter for the National Emergencies Act. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Return of the Emergency 
Introduction 
 
Richard Nixon’s resignation marked a change for the National Emergencies Act from 
research and reporting to legislating. The special committee, led by Sen. Church (D-ID) and Sen. 
Mathias (R-MD), had spent the Nixon administration producing a catalog of emergency powers, 
conferring with executive branch agencies on which powers were obsolete and were necessary, 
and hearing testimony from constitutional scholars and political scientists. Now, the committee 
would actually work to curtail executive power under the Ford administration. Senators Church 
and Mathias would have to bring forth legislation that would avoid a presidential veto yet still 
assert Congress’s role as a coequal branch of government. During that process, the distrust of 
government that defined American politics after Watergate and Vietnam ran headlong into the 
practical realities of governing a 20th-century global superpower. Furthermore, as the New Right 
gained steam in the 1970s, a strong presidency became an attractive method for achieving its 
hawkish foreign policy and desire for leaner government, placing an emerging conservative 
movement at odds with the anti-war liberals in Congress. 
At the same time, the Ford administration found itself caught between capitulation to 
Congress or preserving the province of the executive, either of which could upset the recently 
shaken constitutional order. Ford began his administration leaning towards the former, but 
gradually shifted towards the latter at the same time the Republican party moved in a more 
conservative, pro-executive direction. This posed a dilemma for Mathias and Church, who 
needed to compromise to reform emergency powers but wanted to ensure presidential 
compliance with the bill after passage. As the executive and legislative branches deliberated, the 
importance of process became clearer. Ultimately, the National Emergencies Act did little to 
directly expand or restrict presidential power but instead, it established a framework which 
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would limit the president’s ability to act without Congress’s knowledge within the secrecy of the 
Oval Office. It was the procedures for declaring and terminating a national emergency which 
would prove important, because procedures define the rules of a political landscape, determining 
which actors have which powers and which responsibilities. Procedures can also become 
symbolic of greater issues, as the congressional veto provision of the National Emergencies Act 
would take on larger meaning in a presidency which perceived itself to be under siege.  
Together, the National Emergencies Act and its sister legislation, (IEEPA) would reform the 
chaotic mess of near tyrannical emergency powers discovered by the special committee by 
instituting clear procedures and requiring congressional input. However, permanent emergencies 
first began in the Great Depression and continued during World War II and the Cold War 
because they were expedient solutions to daunting problems. Birthed from the forehead of 
liberalism, the expansion of the federal government, helmed by an infallible presidency, grew 
through the political windows which iterative crises presented. The president could declare an 
emergency, rally the country, and exercise special powers to resolve a crisis, after which the 
emergency could continue because of the continuing specter of crisis and trust that the 
emergency powers would not be abused. Permanent emergencies became the norm simply 
because it was too much trouble to end the emergencies. Détente and the distrust stemming from 
Watergate pushed Congress to pass the National Emergencies Act.  
Ultimately, the National Emergencies Act would become law but fail to constrain 
presidential emergency powers due to a combination of congressional lassitude, compromises 
which preserved executive power, and begrudging acceptance of presidential primacy in national 
security matters. Trust in government returned and détente, condemned by hawkish 
conservatives, died, ending the brief window when Congress shackled the presidency with 
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dozens of framework statutes. Two key framework statutes, the National Emergencies Act and 
IEEPA, would pave the way for a proliferation of future national emergencies without any 
substantial checks on presidential emergency power. The situation decades after the National 
Emergency Act’s passage would look similar to the situation decades prior; ironically, because 
the National Emergencies Act established a congressionally blessed procedure for declaring 
national emergencies beyond the president’s constitutional authority, the law actually enhanced 
presidential powers by codifying and formalizing powers which had developed unplanned and 
unorganized for decades. 
Compromise 
The committee’s relationship with the executive branch was always of paramount 
importance to its basic function. The senators needed to know which emergency statutes were 
useful and which were not, lest the National Emergencies Act accidentally repeal a seemingly 
innocuous law and cause mass bureaucratic chaos. As Frank Church described it, “we are in a 
situation which this Special Committee is trying to correct, whereby Congress, acting pursuant to 
its recommendations, cannot correct without the active cooperation of the President, barring the 
unlikelihood that we could get a two-thirds vote to override his veto.”206  
The need for cooperation with the executive branch presented a dilemma as Congress 
could hardly stand the Nixon administration. When discussing the President’s sole authority to 
declare national emergencies, former Attorney General Richardson told the Senator Case during 
a hearing, “You can’t construct a government, Senator Case, on the premise that nobody can be 
trusted.”  
Sen. Case: “We are now in a point which tests this very deeply.” 
Fmr. Att. Gen. Richardson: “If we have reached that point.” 
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Sen. Case: “We are already at that point.”207 
This lack of trust came to the forefront in 1974, when Staff Director Bill Miller made a 
startling discovery: the president could, during a national emergency, destroy records of an 
executive order or emergency proclamation under the Federal Register Act of 1935. Miller 
discovered this when researching executive orders during national emergencies and was alarmed 
by the implications. The committee found that the president could either declare an executive 
order a secret for national security reasons and hide it from the public, or give the executive 
order another name without changing its legal effect; in the committee’s eyes, this could keep 
matters of tremendous consequence hidden from Congress and the public.208 Nixon suspended 
publication in the Federal Register to keep his bombing in Cambodia covert.209 Senator Mathias 
encapsulated this dread when he said: “Emergencies, historically, from Rome and ancient times 
on, emergencies have been a classic means of usurpation of power by rules from legislative 
bodies.”210 
On August 22, just thirteen days after Nixon resigned, the committee submitted the first 
draft of the National Emergencies Act to the Senate.211 The initial bill would have done several 
major things. First, it deactivated all emergency powers 271 days after the bill’s passage. Second, 
it automatically terminated any future national emergency 180 days after the president or 
Congress declared it, although Congress could extend the emergency. The committee drew this 
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from the United Kingdom’s emergency power regime during the Second World War, when 
Parliament had to re-approve the executive’s emergency authorities every 30 days. Third, it 
allowed Congress to terminate an ongoing national emergency by concurrent resolution, a 
controversial mechanism called a legislative veto. Fourth, the president had to specify which 
emergency powers he was drawing on, so as to prevent presidents from using powers totally 
unrelated to another emergency. Fifth, it required the publication of all emergency proclamations 
in the Federal Register so Congress would remain informed of ongoing emergency actions. 
Lastly, the bill repealed nearly 50 emergency laws, including the all-important Trading with the 
Enemy Act, 8 U.S.C. 1481, which could strip U.S. citizenship from draft dodgers, and 18 U.S.C. 
1383, which allowed the President to declare any land a military zone and imprison anyone 
living there.212 The bill then went to the Government Operations Committee, chaired by Senator 
Sam Ervin, no stranger to with wrestling the executive branch, which unanimously sent the bill 
forward for full Senate approval. 
However, Senators Church and Mathias only introduced the bill after meeting with the 
newly-inaugurated President Ford in the Oval Office and obtaining his endorsement, just to be 
sure passing the bill would not trigger further constitutional tumult. The brief Oval Office 
meeting between Church, Mathias and Ford took place at 10:30 AM on August 22. Ford’s 
adviser Bill Timmons, who had served as Assistant for Legislative Affairs since the very 
beginning of the Nixon administration, cautioned Ford against supporting the bill, which he felt 
would tilt the interbranch power balance too greatly in favor of Congress.213 Other staffers like 
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Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs Kenneth Cole, Deputy Assistant to the President 
for Congressional Relations Tom Korologos, and OMB General Counsel Stanley Ebner opposed 
Congress limiting presidential powers, but did not adviser Ford directly on the National 
Emergencies Act.214  While the senators and the White House both agreed to repeal obsolete 
emergency power statutes, which the special committee and executive branch agencies had 
cooperatively reviewed, the Ford administration had some qualms with the bill. The Department 
of Justice did not support the bill, which it feared could have dire implications for the 
Department of Defense, the agency which relied the most on emergency statutes for routine 
business. They also objected because of the seemingly too-short grace period for re-enacting 
emergency statutes which needed amending and because the law prevented the president from 
extending a state of emergency.215  
Despite the strong objections from the White House staff and Department of Justice, 
President Ford declared he felt “fully sympathetic” for the legislation.216 He and the senators 
agreed on terminating the existing national emergencies, establishing regular and consistent 
procedures for declaring future national emergencies, and even dispatched executive branch 
staffers to help the special committee work out the disagreements between the branches.217 This 
highlights the split-brain approach of the Ford administration on executive powers, which was 
caught between combating or compromising with Congress. 
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 Despite the absence of trust, the threat of a veto compelled the committee to compromise 
with the nascent Ford administration just as the bill, S.3957, came to the Senate floor. At the last 
minute, on October 7, Senator Mathias went onto the Senate floor to offer amendments 
suggested by the Office of Management and Budget. At the White House’s request, Church and 
Mathias had delayed voting on the National Emergencies Act to hear these suggestions and agree 
to them.218 These amendments were part of a last-minute compromise between the White House 
and the committee to alter the bill and prevent Congress from scoring such a major victory over 
the President.  
These amendments were substantial. First, they eliminated the automatic six-month 
termination of national emergencies, instead of requiring Congress to actively end an emergency 
in a mandatory meeting every six months. The amendments whittled down the list of repealed 
statutes by sending obsolete ones to the House Codification Committee; however, the 
amendments exempted the Trading with the Enemy Act and the Read Reserve provision (this 
enabled the President to call up the reserves unilaterally), the two most useful emergency laws. 
Importantly, the new bill mandated that a national emergency terminates after a year, but the 
president could extend it indefinitely simply by notifying Congress and publishing that 
notification in the Federal Register. This minor procedural adjustment had profound 
ramifications since it required the congressional initiative to change the status quo. Senator Roth 
then added an amendment requiring the President to keep all significant orders on file during a 
national emergency, so as to improve transparency and prevent future inter-branch conflict over 
government records.219 Lastly, the bill established a one-year grace period, later extended to two 
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years, for the executive to amend or substitute emergency powers which had become necessary 
for routine government operations. For example, in August 1971 the Treasury Department used 
the Trading with the Enemies Act to limit the export of soybeans.220 The act also totally 
exempted a few emergency powers so critical that the Ford administration did not want to risk 
Congress not amending or revising them during the grace period; this exemption covered the 
Trading with the Enemy Act but required Congress address the exempted laws within 270 days. 
The National Emergencies Act passed the Senate without dissent on October 7, 1974, which 
Senator Mathias called “a major step toward ending the erosion of constitutional government.”221 
But the bill would not make it to the House. Overwhelmed with confirming Nelson 
Rockefeller to the Vice Presidency and concluding their investigation into Watergate, the House 
Judiciary Committee was too busy to make progress on the legislation. This did not surprise 
Mathias and Church, who worked with Rep. Peter Rodino (D-NJ), chair of the House Judiciary 
Committee, to reintroduce the bill early in the next session.222 This marks a new chapter in the 
history of the National Emergencies Act, one marked by complex interbranch dynamics and the 
politics of power after Watergate. 
Horseshoe politics and Presidential Power in the 1970s 
In the mid-1970s, both liberals and conservatives began to change their views on 
presidential power. While Watergate and Vietnam fueled liberal disillusionment with an activist 
presidency, as expressed by the National Emergencies Act, conservatives, on the rise in the 
Republican party, had a much more favorable view.  
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Ditching the anti-executive viewpoints of Robert Taft and John Bricker, conservatives 
embraced a strong executive both as a means of defending against communism and as a tool for 
curtailing the size of government. For instance, while presidents since Jefferson had impounded 
appropriated funds to gut programs they disliked, Nixon escalated it, impounding more than $12 
billion by 1973.223 Congress was shocked by Nixon re-writing their budgets without their 
control, so Congress, led by Senator Ervin, bill manager for the National Emergencies Act, 
passed the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to stop the practice. With impoundment ruled out, 
Ford used his veto to curtail government spending and save “the taxpayers billions of dollars.”224 
However, to conservatives, Congress was preventing the president from decisively cutting 
wasteful and unnecessary government spending which was exacerbating inflation.  
Support for a strong executive was not confined to the executive branch. Barry Goldwater 
published an article in the Virginia Journal of International Law in the summer of 1973, which 
made his viewpoint crystal clear. He wrote, “The Office of the Presidency has come under the 
most vigorous attack of any period in history. … To them [Congress], he acts more as an elected 
Monarch than he does the elected leader of a democratic Republic.” He lambasted the War 
Powers Resolution as unconstitutional, castigated the critics of executive agreements, whereby 
the president entered into foreign arrangements without referring to the Senate for ratification 
and chastised Congress for infringing on executive privilege, which was so vital for military 
security. Goldwater also argued the post-World War II shift in foreign affairs power from 
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Congress to the presidency, which motivated liberals like Fulbright and Church to support bills 
like the War Powers Resolution of National Emergencies Act, was a myth, because the 
presidents from Washington to Nixon had sent the military into combat at least 200 times 
without congressional approval. The archetypal Cold War hawk viewed the president as rightly 
dominant over national security matters, despite being a member of Congress, because a strong 
presidency was critical for American military primacy. Goldwater attacked the senators and 
representatives who wanted to weaken the presidency as embodying the “death wish of 
dreamers, who think we have no problems and no need for a commitment to our national 
security.”225 However, Goldwater’s zeal for an activist presidency was likely an extension of his 
anti-communism and not a belief in the inherent value of executive power, since he later sued 
President Carter for ending a defense treaty with Taiwan without consulting Congress.226  
However, some conservatives were wary of the uptick in presidential power. Robert 
Welch, the founder of the anti-communist John Birch Society, spoke for two hours at a Los 
Angeles political banquet in March 1974 about how “Mr. Nixon has already been assuming and 
exercising dictatorial power.” Chief among his complaints were making war without 
congressional authorization, making executive agreements to avoid getting treaties ratified by the 
Senate and defying the court system for his own gain.227 Similarly, the Liberty Lobby, a 
conservative anti-communist advocacy organization, endorsed the work of Senators Church and 
Mathias and National Emergencies Act. To the Liberty Lobby, “[t]his important matter is long 
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overdue, and should provide the means of restoring, in large measure, the proper balance of 
governmental powers.”228  
While the John Birch Society represented an anti-executive anti-communist aspect of the 
Republican party, a more pro-executive anti-communist wing emerged during the late 1970s. 
Ford’s Chief of Staff Dick Cheney was one member of the administration focused on preserving 
presidential power. He, along with Press Secretary Ron Nessen, put together draft responses for 
how to answer press questions about presidential power. They argued, “The powers of the 
President are established by the Constitution and by law and there have been no fundamental 
changes in these grants of authority.” They saw Congress’s actions as “a natural reaction to the 
steady growth of Executive Branch power over the past 40 years” and were “sure it’s also a 
reaction to Watergate and Vietnam.” However, to them, only the president could manage day-to-
day diplomacy, and cited the disruptive effects of Congress on issues like “Angola, aid to 
Turkey, Soviet emigration and trade, and damaging disruptions of our legitimate foreign 
intelligence activities.”229 The support for a strong executive played into the growing 
hawkishness within the Republican Party. Support for détente weakened Ford during his brutal 
1976 primary battle with Ronald Reagan and gradually fell apart during the Carter 
administration, as conservative forces within Congress scuttled SALT II and the Panama treaties 
proved an albatross for their supporters on Capitol Hill.230 Carter’s limp responses to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Hostage Crisis helped conservatives paint him as 
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feckless and feeble, undermining the political center on foreign policy issues.231 The resurgent 
anti-communism within the Republican Party and among Democratic neo-conservatives fostered 
a fondness for a decisive chief executive which would last for years. 
Despite these important political shifts, the National Emergencies Act did not dominate 
headlines, as important historical topics often do. Watergate devoured all the oxygen and what 
was left went to inflation, the energy crisis, or the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Even after Nixon’s 
resignation, the issue of emergency powers, too legalistic and obscure for front pages, faded into 
the background as the Church Committee exposed rampant wrongdoing by U.S. intelligence 
agencies both at home and abroad and took away staff from the special committee. However, the 
lack of public attention does not mean the National Emergencies Act is insignificant, as 
historically significant events often slip through newsrooms unnoticed.  
The press reported a fair amount on the National Emergencies Act, placing it in the 
context of Vietnam and Watergate and emphasizing the shocking extent of the president’s 
powers. For instance, The Los Angeles Times wrote that the Vietnam War spurred Congress to 
address dormant emergency powers which could threaten individual liberties, listing the 
president’s powers in a shocking lede.232 The Washington Post reported on the “permanent state 
of emergency” which had consumed the country for decades and corroded American 
democracy.233 The only TV airtime dedicated to the National Emergencies Act was from Howard 
K. Smith, who used his nightly “Comment” section on the ABC Evening News to agree with 
Senators Church and Mathias’s committee report and endorsed an end to the climate of crisis.234 
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However, one exception was when James Kilpatrick, a state’s rights segregationist, nationally 
syndicated columnist and panelist on Crossfire, made a potent observation when reporting on the 
passage of the National Emergencies Act noting, “Ideologies march around a circle, and now and 
then they meet.” To him, passing the National Emergencies Act was one such meeting.235 The 
issue of presidential power, particularly in the realm of national security, defies clear ideological 
or partisan delineation. This takes on special significance when applied to beliefs about big 
government versus small government or the role of the Constitution in modern politics, revealing 
complexities and contradictions which underlie past and contemporary political discourses.   
Reintroducing the Bill 
Since the National Emergencies Act had passed the Senate in 1974 but failed to move 
into the House, causing it to die at the end of the 1974 session, a representative would have to 
reintroduce the bill to kickstart the legislative process. A close confidant of Church and Mathias, 
Rep. Peter Rodino (D-NJ) reintroduced the National Emergencies Act in the House as H.R. 3884 
on February 27, 1975. H.R. 3884 was a carbon copy of the amended bill introduced by Senator 
Mathias the previous October, and the House immediately referred it to the Judiciary Committee. 
Senator Mathias also reintroduced the bill as S. 977, but all the legislative movement took place 
in the House. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental 
Relations, chaired by Representative Walter Flowers, then held hearings on H.R. 3884 in March 
and April 1975. 
The committee hearings brought in government lawyers from the State, Treasury, 
Defense, and Justice Departments to speak on the bill’s efficacy and also sought the guidance of 
Senators Church and Mathias, who testified together about how H.R. 3884 would return the 
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United States to normal constitutional government and “restore to the Congress its full role in the 
legislative branch.”236 The hearings showcased a high level of compromise and comity between 
the executive and the legislature; every witness supported passing the National Emergencies Act 
and several committee members and witnesses remarked on the strong cooperation between the 
two branches.237 The special committee also remarked in a report how the bill “has received 
broad bipartisan support and elicited a rare degree of cooperation between the Executive and 
Legislative branches of government.”238 
However, one area of disagreement arose during the hearings. Assistant Attorney General 
Antonin Scalia, who as head of the Office of the Legal Counsel provided legal interpretations 
and advice to the executive branch, gave his support for the bill but objected to the section 
allowing Congress to terminate national emergencies by concurrent resolutions. The resolutions 
would pass both houses by a simple majority but would have the force of law without a 
presidential signature or veto. While this mechanism was appealing for checking presidential 
power, it raised serious constitutional issues since it effectively sidestepped the president’s veto 
power. 
The Ford administration was particularly keen to keep the presidency from losing its 
primacy to Congress in the aftermath of Watergate. In draft responses to reporters’ questions on 
presidential power, the Ford administration denied that the presidency had lost its basic powers. 
Press Secretary Ron Nessen wrote that “This is probably a natural reaction to the steady growth 
of Executive Branch power over the past 40 years. I’m sure it is also a reaction to Watergate and 
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Vietnam.” He cited Ford’s vetoes as proof of his willingness to stand up to the Democratic 
Congress and pointed out that although Congress has an important role to play in foreign policy, 
“in an era of intercontinental missiles and instant communications, only the President can 
manage day-to-day relations with more than 100 foreign nations.”239 Ford’s veto of the 
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act in May 1976, when he was 
fighting Ronald Reagan to win the Republican primary, shows Ford’s desire to protect the 
president’s prerogatives. In his veto message, Ford cited the bill’s “unwise restrictions that 
would seriously inhibit” his constitutional powers and a coherent foreign policy.240 After he left 
office, Ford gave a speech at an American Enterprise Institute where he warned of an imperiled 
presidency, rather than an imperial presidency, which an activist judiciary and resurgent 
Congress had thoroughly hobbled. He said Congress may be “the world's greatest deliberative 
body, and I think it is, but it is just not prepared for crisis management of our foreign policy.” He 
said, “Congress in recent years has gone too far in many areas in trying to assume powers that 
belong to the President and the executive branch,” and that “We should never send a President of 
this great country to the bargaining table with one hand tied behind him.” Ford was particularly 
critical of how intelligence reforms had deprived the president of quality intelligence, which was 
all the more critical as the Iranian Revolution gathered steam.241 
Ford had not always been such a staunch defender of the executive. A multi-term 
congressman from Michigan, Ford gave a speech in December 1963 on the “Growth of 
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Executive Power.” In a spirited defense of the separation of powers, he said, “If the executive 
branch succeeds through the exercise of its tremendous power in obtaining control of the 
legislative branch, as has been increasingly the case, then tyranny is the result.” Like Church and 
Mathias after him, Ford juxtaposed the bloated presidency with references to Hitler, Mussolini, 
and Stalin, alongside quotations from The Federalist Papers. While later liberal senators placed 
the blame for the accretion of presidential power on a constant crisis which pervaded the nation 
since the Great Depression, Ford blamed the politics of promises, which in a modern-day spoils 
system, used leverage over interest groups to ensure a subservient Congress.242 However, where 
one stands often depends on where one sits, and the Oval Office is a most intoxicating seat of 
power. 
Despite his past views, the Ford administration was eager to defend the presidency and 
saw legislative veto by concurrent resolution as an important issue. The legislative veto was not a 
new issue; Franklin Roosevelt made similar objections to provisions within the Lend-Lease Act 
of 1941, and the First and Second War Powers Acts during World War II. President Hoover 
created the concept in 1929 when he wanted to streamline his government reorganization bill by 
having Congress vote up-or-down on his proposed reorganization.243 However, Congress in the 
1970s began included legislative veto clauses in a wide variety of legislation, ranging from war 
powers to impoundment, and agency regulations, and even allowed a single house or committee 
in some cases to pass a concurrent resolution without presidential assent.244 In September 1974, 
Stanley Ebner, General Counsel to the Office of Management and Budget, formed a task force to 
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tackle legislative encroachments, which primarily focused on legislative vetoes, although 
restrictions on appointments and executive agreements could also be included. In a tone similar 
to Church and Mathias, the task force warned the legislative veto “could conceivably be used to 
entirely usurp the Executive’s independent authority.”245 Justice Department lawyers even drew 
up a list of statutes which included legislative veto provisions for presidential counsel Rodrick 
Hills in June 1975. The list included 119 laws which allowed Congress to sidestep the 
president’s veto power, although the list was likely incomplete due to a rushed schedule and 
limited staff.246 Ford used his veto power to block the more egregious legislative encroachments, 
while Justice Department lawyers Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, and White House Counsel Philip 
Buchen produced legal analysis and congressional testimony registering their opposition. 
Passing the Bill 
While the executive and legislature sparred over niche constitutional questions, the 
National Emergencies Act wound its way through Congress. On May 21, 1975, the bill left the 
House Judiciary Committee and later passed the full House on September 4, with only five 
representatives voting against it. Those five, led by Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) and Rep. Robert 
Drinan (D-MA), wanted to automatically terminate national emergencies after only 90 days, 
effectively undoing the delicate compromise with the executive, but their amendment failed and 
the law passed.247 The bill then went to the Senate Government Operations Committee once 
again, where it passed with some technical amendments on August 26, 1976. The Senate then 
sent the bill to the president’s desk and he signed it on September 14, 1976, almost two years 
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after its first introduction and four years after the special committee began. Assessing the 
committee’s work, Sen. Mathias said, “The work done by the Special Committee on Emergency 
Powers has been a pioneering effort. It has laid the groundwork, I believe, for bringing the whole 
area of national security and secret activities under constitutional processes.”248  
The Ford administration turned the bill signing into a non-event. The president only 
invited Sen. Mathias to the Oval Office for the ceremony, but upon arriving, he realized no one 
had even bothered to tell Sen. Church. Mathias had to call his co-chair and bring him to the 
White House for a brief photograph and signing. Mathias brought his two sons along to witness 
the ceremony, but the only officials there were Ford, Mathias, and Church. The bill signing was 
not even on the president’s official schedule; the press only learned about it when Ron Nessen 
casually mentioned it at a press briefing. The press peppered Nessen wanting to know why the 
National Emergencies Act, which Church referred to as the most important bill he had passed in 
Congress, had received no attention and was signed in private. Nessen had to obfuscate by 
saying someone else made the decision to sign the bill privately, but he could not give a clear 
answer as to who. Helen Thomas, the longtime White House correspondent for United Press 
International, asked why the administration buried the bill signing: “It [NEA] takes a hell of a lot 
of power away from the President. Not to spotlight legislation like that is incredible, especially 
after the kind of exposure we have had on bill signings of much lesser impact on the Nation.” 
The press pool also pointed out the hypocrisy of the president supporting legislation promoting 
transparency in government while signing major bills covertly, without any press involvement. 
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Nessen stonewalled and insisted that bill signings were an internal White House matter and 
would stay as such.249 It is unclear who decided to keep the bill signing private or why. 
In his signing statement, Ford made his disapproval of the National Emergencies Act’s 
legislative veto provision clear. He stated, “Such provisions are contrary to the general 
constitutional principle of separation of powers whereby Congress enacts laws but the President 
and the agencies of government execute them.” He continued, saying, “they violate Article I, 
section 7 of the United States Constitution which requires that resolutions having the force of 
law be sent to the President for his signature or veto.”250 Ford even pointed out that he had 
directed the Attorney General to join the lawsuit Buckley v Valeo, which would challenge the 
constitutionality of the legislative veto provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act, although 
the Supreme Court ultimately declined to definitively rule on the issue. Despite the issue of 
legislative encroachment, the Ford administration supported the National Emergencies Act and 
worked with the special committee to produce an acceptable bipartisan bill.  
The National Emergencies Act was the first time Congress set limits on the president’s 
emergency powers. Like the War Powers Act, it established procedures for the president to 
follow when exercising emergency powers, while also mandating consultation with Congress 
and transparency within the executive branch. The National Emergencies Act had several goals: 
to reassert congressional oversight over emergency powers, to established procedures to prevent 
legal ambiguities in a crisis, to end government by permanent emergency, and to ensure 
Congress would never be blindsided by undiscovered accumulated powers again. 
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Shortly after the National Emergencies Act passed, Congress tackled the Trading with the 
Enemy Act, the statutory authorization for so much of the United States’ Cold War sanctions 
architecture. By the 1970s, the Trading with the Enemy Act was the basis for economic sanctions 
on the People’s Republic of China, North Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, and several other 
communist foes.251 The federal government has also emergency powers to support some 
intrusive economic intervention in the vein of FDR’s bank holiday. Between 1945 and 1952, the 
U.S. government seized and operated 35 private businesses, relying on the War Labor Disputes 
Act and, after it expired, the 1916 Transportation Act.252 By the 1970s, the political calculus 
favored deregulation and removing federal economic controls. This intersected with the drive to 
reform emergency powers to produce the International Emergency Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). 
Congress passed IEEPA on December 15, 1977, and President Carter signed it on 
December 28.253 The act limited the Trading with the Enemy Act to declared wars and amended 
related laws to ensure congruity across statutes. The law granted the president the authority to 
“investigate, regulate or prohibit – (i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of credit 
or payments between, by or through or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers 
or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof, (iii) the import or 
export of currency or securities” and also gave the president sweeping powers over property “in 
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.” However, unlike the Trading 
with the Enemy Act, this authority applied only “any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has 
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its source in whole or substantial part outside of the United States” for which the president had 
declared a national emergency, meaning the president could not use IEEPA for domestic 
economic controls as Franklin Roosevelt used the Trading with the Enemy Act. It is also worth 
noting that Carter, much like Ford, objected to IEEPA’s legislative veto provision, indicating an 
institutional rather than partisan conflict over congressional powers.254 The National 
Emergencies Act and IEEPA created a new legal regime for emergency powers, organizing a 
patchwork quilt of legal authorities into a coherent framework, the product of executive and 
legislative compromise.  
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Conclusion: The Phantom Emergency 
 
The National Emergencies Act did not restore the constitutional balance of powers as its 
drafters envisioned, nor did it end the permanent state of emergency, nor foreclose any potential 
abuse of emergency powers. For the most part, the law was an absolute failure. There are now 
more than 30 active national emergencies, which stretch back to 1979, when Jimmy Carter 
declared a national emergency using IEEPA to block “all property and interests in property of 
the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran 
which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States…”255 Presidents have 
routinely extended this national emergency through the National Emergencies Act, producing a 
40-year emergency. Presidents have declared 58 national emergencies since 1976 and 31 of them 
are still ongoing.256 While the president may not exercise the nearly dictatorial powers left on the 
books in 1975, presidents may still exert tremendous influence over the lives of American 
citizens through economic controls, seizure of internet infrastructure, or deploying U.S. armed 
forces domestically. A recent Brennan Center for Justice report found 123 statutes delegating to 
the president additional authority in a national emergency, which while a decrease from 470 
statutes, is not insubstantial.257 
 Why did the National Emergencies Act fail? Part of it was congressional acquiescence. 
Although Congress is required to vote every six months to terminate a national emergency, they 
have yet to hold a single such vote in over 40 years under the National Emergencies Act. No one 
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knows why this has never happened, but when representatives and senators focus increasingly on 
fundraising, there is little time for legislating on issues which until recently few people have 
noticed.258This has allowed the presidency to run roughshod over the coequal branch, declaring 
and extending national emergencies without so much as a whimper from the legislature. Another 
danger of the National Emergencies Act is that it gives the president nearly absolute discretion in 
declaring an emergency, which is why the Sudanese Civil War, Somali pirates, and, now, a 
“crisis” at the southern border rise to the level of national emergencies.259 Because National 
Emergencies Act preserved the executive’s ability to define a national emergency extremely 
broadly, the president can declare anything a national emergency and based on current case law, 
the judiciary would have a difficult time second-guessing the president’s judgment.260 This was 
one prediction of Clinton Rossiter’s influential Constitutional Dictatorship, which argued 
allowing the executive to define the terms of its own powers could lead to abuses when a 
democratic state concentrates power in the executive during a crisis.261 Yet congressional 
acquiescence when drafting the bill also proved lethal; much like the War Powers Resolution, the 
NEA gave the presidency enough statutory authorization to accomplish its policy goals while 
blessing the president’s actions with congressional authorization.262 
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The Supreme Court is also partially responsible for neutering the National Emergencies 
Act. In INS v. Chadha (1983), the Supreme Court ruled that a congressional resolution could not 
override an emergency declaration without the president’s signature.263 The need to overcome an 
inevitable veto forces Congress to muster a two-thirds vote in both houses should it ever try to 
claw its power back under the terms of the National Emergencies Act. This only increased the 
obstacles for Congress to reassert its statutory authority under the NEA. 
The National Emergency Act was also a product of Vietnam and Watergate, and without 
recent political shocks driving popular support for reform, the statutes ultimately failed to 
accomplish their goals. Leading advocates for addressing overgrown emergency powers failed to 
anticipate future demands for an assertive presidency during the War on Terror, failed to build 
popular awareness or support for the issue, and made critical decisions in the legislative process 
which undermined the reform effort.264 Over time, enthusiasm for the reform dwindled as 
executive power faded from the forefront of political concerns and the liberal anti-war cohort of 
senators gradually left office. 
But ultimately, the realities of American hegemony demand a strong president capable of 
responding to crises and exercising a coherent foreign policy. Senator Fulbright, speaking during 
the Vietnam War said that if “America is to become an empire, there is very little chance that it 
can avoid becoming a virtual dictatorship as well.”265 Professors Adrian Vermuele and Eric 
Posner argue in Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic that emergency powers 
might undermine liberal constitutionalism, allowing for a stronger executive more adaptable to 
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the rigors of modern governing.266 Routine emergency government, which tracked the growth of 
the American state during the New Deal and Cold War, had become too indispensable to the 
realities of governing to eliminate. Emergencies allowed the executive to take decisive steps 
outside of traditional avenues of the political process. The demands of the modern American 
state, especially in foreign affairs, has drawn presidents towards emergency powers as Congress 
and the judiciary stand mutely by. The National Emergencies Act failed to address the roots 
causes of the growth of emergency power in the 20th century and as a result, lies utterly broken 
by ongoing constitutional behaviors. 
However, the dynamics encouraging dependence on permanent emergencies have 
changed since the National Emergencies Act became law. Originally, routine use of emergency 
powers was a way of managing a large federal bureaucracy, especially during severe crises. 
Now, partisanship in Congress has turned the American legislature into a dysfunctional 
parliamentary circus, a shadow of its former self. The vast majority of ongoing national 
emergencies use IEEPA to sanction state and non-state actors around the world, simply because 
going to an intensely partisan Congress would consume precious political capital and man-hours. 
The rising tide of partisanship is better tackled by scholars like Julian Zelizer and Kevin Kruse, 
or Norm Ornstein and Thomas Mann.267 However, the undeniable rise of partisanship in 
American politics, desiccating and incessant though it may be, could bring about new restrictions 
on presidential powers. When he declared a national emergency, President Trump said, “So I’m 
going to be signing a national emergency. And it’s been signed many times before.  It’s been 
signed by other Presidents from 1977 or so. It gave the Presidents the power. There’s rarely been 
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a problem.  They sign it; nobody cares.  I guess they weren’t very exciting.  But nobody 
cares.”268  
But suddenly, it seems people care once again. For the first time under the National 
Emergencies Act, Congress, on February 22, 2019, voted to end a national emergency.269 On 
March 14, 59 senators, both Republicans, and Democrats like the National Emergencies Act’s 
drafters, voted to terminate Trump’s national emergency, prompting the president to tweet only 
minutes later “VETO!”270 The next day, the president followed through on his tweet, issuing his 
first veto and the first-ever veto of a bill to terminate a national emergency.271 The entire episode 
reiterates the mixed politics of presidential power, as the libertarian right slides leftward. Sen. 
Jerry Moran (R-KS) said, “I believe the use of emergency powers in this circumstance violates 
the Constitution. This continues our country down the path of all-powerful executive — 
something those who wrote the Constitution were fearful of. … The law passed by Congress 
years ago allowing the president emergency powers is flawed and needs to be repealed or 
amended.”272 Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT) voted for repealing the emergency, saying “This is a 
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vote for the Constitution and for the balance of powers that is at its core. For the Executive 
Branch to override a law passed by Congress would make it the ultimate power rather than a 
balancing power.”273 
Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) even introduced a bill to reform the National Emergencies Act. 
Called the “Assuring that Robust, Thorough, and Informed Congressional Leadership is 
Exercised Over National Emergencies Act” or ARTICLE ONE Act, the bill, sponsored by 14 
Republican senators, limits national emergencies to 30 days, requires a congressional vote to 
extend a national emergency further, introduces new reporting requirements, and allows 
Congress to limit the president’s specific emergency powers while approving the national 
emergency declaration.274 Even President Trump supports reforming the NEA, tweeting, “If, at a 
later date, Congress wants to update the law, I will support those efforts but today’s issue is 
BORDER SECURITY and Crime!!! Don’t vote with Pelosi!”275 Whether or not meaningful 
reform of the National Emergencies Act materializes, this episode highlights how in a deeply 
partisan era, constitutional prerogatives and fears of unchecked presidential power can still 
overcome party lines. Studying previous reforms of national emergencies and their role in 
American history can reveal the merits and faults of the National Emergencies Act and help 
inform the future of presidential power. For future reforms to succeed, they will have to avoid 
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the pitfalls of institutional indolence, procedural shortsightedness, and deference which doomed 
the National Emergencies Act; perhaps further studying the legislation’s history will reveal 
important insights into how to address presidential powers today.  
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